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There has recently been a rapid growth in international literature and research on the 
links between economic growth and social capability and their impact upon well-being.  
This paper draws on that literature to build upon previous Treasury work at the 
intersection of economic and social policy.  It  examines the relationship between a 
productive economy and a society that enjoys high levels of participation, connection 
and cohesion, and their combined impact of peoples’ well-being.  It suggests that the 
objective in an inclusive economy is to improve the well-being of New Zealanders by 
directing policy to ensure that there are broad based opportunities to participate in 
society and the economy. 
 
The paper notes the ‘virtuous’ and ‘vicious’ circles that can occur when positive or 
negative interrelationships arise as a result of the above links.  It suggests that there 
are five broad policy themes that are particularly important for building a more inclusive 
New Zealand economy.  In particular there are a small number of policy areas where 
there appear to be opportunities for gains in equity and participation while being neutral 
or even positive for growth.  These opportunities lie in focusing on education and jobs 
in the lower part of the distribution of attainment and skills; on strengthening Maori 
institutions and governance; and improving understanding of and reporting of the 
results of government action.   
 
Three Treasury companion papers to this one expand on particular aspects of the 
inclusive economy.  They are Reducing Disparities in an Inclusive Economy 
(forthcoming),  Human Capital and the Inclusive Economy and Geography and the 
Inclusive Economy: A Regional Perspective. 
 
 
JEL classification:  A1 General economics, H0 Public economics - general, O2 Development 
planning and policy, R1 General special economics 
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Foreword by the Minister
The vast majority of New Zealanders no doubt share my own vision for the future of this
country.  It is a vision where prosperity, opportunity and social justice combine to
continuously improve the well-being of all citizens.
Achieving this requires us to build an economy that is both inclusive and innovative.  This is
by no means a straightforward task.  We know that people have many aspirations and
concerns. We know that these varying aspirations are not easy to reconcile.  We know that
providing for these aspirations requires a high-performing economy.
Working towards an inclusive economy requires a focus both on policies that enhance
growth and on policies that enhance opportunities for New Zealanders of all cultures and
backgrounds to participate in society and the economy.  It also requires well-functioning
and trustworthy institutions, along with certain freedoms and mutually respected values.
When I took over the Finance portfolio, I saw this work as being particularly important.  I
therefore instructed the Treasury to give a high priority to further work on the challenge of
building a more inclusive and innovative economy.
I welcome the contribution of the Treasury team that produced Towards an Inclusive
Economy.  Their analysis and review of the evidence in this complex area improves our
understanding of some key linkages among economic and social capabilities, and how these
in turn might best be used to improve the well-being of New Zealanders.
The Treasury’s work is complementary to other work being conducted within the
Government, including the Ministry of Social Policy’s work on social development, the
Ministry of Economic Development’s work on economic development, and the work being led
by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet on sustainable development.
This work will offer a means to improve policy advice on growing an innovative and inclusive
economy, and on reducing inequalities. It will also facilitate improved co-ordination across a
range of government activities.
Hon Dr Michael Cullen
Treasurer and Minister of FinanceTowards an Inclusive Economy      5
Preface
Towards an Inclusive Economy sets out the Treasury’s thinking on how the Government can
achieve its goal of an inclusive economy.
It builds on our briefing to the incoming Government, Towards Higher Living Standards for
New Zealanders, and on our previous work at the intersection of social and economic policy.
It advances that work by taking account of a rapidly evolving body of work and empirical
evidence, much of it very recent.  And, while based on past work, it represents a significant
step forward in the Treasury’s thinking on how to achieve higher living standards for New
Zealanders.
Our aims for Towards an Inclusive Economy are ambitious.  We want to give governments
ways to help them reconcile objectives that are often seen as competing – economic growth
and social equity.  We want to help governments make tough decisions about how to
prioritise spending to help secure well-being for all New Zealanders, while not
compromising the essentials of a strong, innovative economy.  We’ve therefore given a very
high priority to this project, and committed significant resources to it.
I believe the end product achieves these aims, and I’m extremely proud of our achievement.
The work has benefited from close engagement with a wide range of other departments,
particularly the Ministry of Social Policy which is engaged in a complementary work
programme focusing on social development.
I also hope this work will be of considerable assistance to all departments, including the
Treasury, as we work towards building a productive economy and an inclusive society.
Dr A E Bollard
Secretary to the Treasury6      Towards an Inclusive Economy
Executive Summary
This paper forms part of Treasury’s reporting on Key Priority 3: “An Inclusive Economy”,
one of four priority areas for 2000/1 agreed with the Minister of Finance.
It examines the relationship between a productive economy and a society that enjoys high
levels of participation, connection and cohesion and their combined impact on people’s well-
being.  It then looks at the broad implications of these linkages for policy choices.  The
report draws upon previous work within Treasury and upon a rapidly burgeoning but recent
body of literature and evidence on social capability and the economy.
There are three companion pieces to this paper expanding on particular aspects of our work
on an inclusive economy.  They are a Treasury paper (Treasury, 2001a) Human Capital and
the Inclusive Economy, a Treasury report (Treasury, 2001b) Geography and the Inclusive
Economy: A Regional Perspective, and a Treasury paper (Treasury, 2000) Framework for
Closing the Gaps.
An inclusive economy
An inclusive economy provides well-being to New Zealanders by ensuring that there
are broad-based opportunities to participate in society and the economy – thereby
opening up the key routes to improved well-being.  The objective of the government in
such an economy is to improve well-being by ensuring that policy is directed to these
ends.
An inclusive economy can be seen as deriving from the inter-relationships between
social capability, productive capability, and well-being.
Social capability.  When there are high levels of participation, interconnection and
cohesion, there are correspondingly high levels of social capability; that is, a high level
of the ability of various interests in society to co-operate towards common goals.
Social capability is positively dependent on levels of human capital, well-functioning
institutions, and social cohesion and connectedness, and negatively dependent on the
extent of social exclusion of individuals and groups.
Productive capability, and the income and wealth it generates, is an important
determinant of a country’s standard of living.  The amount of this wealth and income
going to households on the lower rungs of the income distribution is also important.Towards an Inclusive Economy      7
Well-being.  Individuals’ sense of well-being has several aspects.   One is the ability to
participate in the economy, through jobs and incomes, and the important sense of
fulfilment that accompanies satisfying jobs.   Another is participation in society
generally, through such things as social networks, family, whakapapa, community and
tribal relationships, and civic activities.




arising from consumption of goods and services, family, 
health, job, security, community, freedoms and 
opportunities 
Productive capability  
arising from inputs of labour, capital 
and technology, and productivity 
Social capability  
arising from norms, values, trust, 
institutions, networks, human capital 
The relationships can often be mutually reinforcing – for instance economic growth
generally increases opportunities for active participation in the economy and in social
relationships through the labour market while, at the same time, better social
networks and the trust built up through economic transactions are positive for further
economic growth.
However, there can also be negative interactions – for instance, growth may involve
structural change, loss of jobs, and increased social tension as well as increased
opportunities and living standards.
The positive linkages in each direction have the potential to generate virtuous (or
vicious) circles, and win-win opportunities for policy.  In the context of these
relationships, we have identified five broad policy areas that are particularly
important to building a more inclusive economy.
Growth and distribution
Improved well-being of New Zealanders is vitally linked to our ability to achieve and
sustain a steady rate of growth in our national income per head.  Therefore, in looking
for new and more effective ways to enhance well-being, we cannot afford to overlook
the basics – those elements of fiscal, monetary and regulatory policy that are
important for growth, stability and the efficient functioning of key markets – or to
create, inadvertently, new conditions that undermine our growth fundamentals.
However, these considerations must be considered alongside policies to help deliver
better outcomes for the poorer members of society, notably those in less well-off ethnic
groups or regions.8      Towards an Inclusive Economy
Well-being is not a static state of being, but changes according to an individual’s
opportunities, choices and circumstances.  We need to take account of the importance
of helping those on the bottom rungs of the income distribution to improve their life
chances while enhancing the prospects for economic growth.  This suggests that a
focus on education, training, and promotion of labour market participation is better
than a focus on passive income transfers (with the associated downsides of passive tax
redistribution) when trying to improve well-being for the most disadvantaged.  It also
suggests a need for greater public consensus so as to maintain policy stability.
Human capital
There is strong and consistent evidence that human capital – that is, people’s
education and skills – is positively associated with well-being both directly and
through raising economic performance and social capability.  There is also a positive
association between education and many other outcomes – including health, lower
criminal offending, participation in voluntary community activity, political
participation, and trust.  In addition, there is probably some transmission of human
capital across generations.
However, human capital has many different dimensions and is acquired in a wide
variety of settings – from formal education to the community – which raises a number
of questions about the best policies for the acquisition of human capital.  In
particular, there is a potential tension between human capital policies that aim to
secure overall growth and those that aim to improve overall distributional outcomes.
There are also questions over which level of education – early childhood, primary,
secondary, post-compulsory – should receive most attention.
New Zealand ranks well internationally in educational attainment in the top half of
the distribution, but does less well in the bottom quintile.  This suggests that our prime
focus should be on more cost-effective early interventions in childhood learning,
particularly in the early primary school years, coupled with carefully selected second-
chance education and training interventions, where these can be shown to be
appropriate to the needs of specific individuals and groups.  This will particularly help
the Mäori and Pacific Island populations given their relative predominance in younger
cohorts.
Policies to promote “centres of excellence” in tertiary education, and better linkages
between universities and technologically progressive industries are important for
fostering innovation and growth.
Jobs
The loss of jobs and the experience of unemployment have a strongly negative impact
on personal well-being and sometimes that of whole communities. Conversely, high
employment has a long list of benefits for society and the economy.  This means
policies to promote increased opportunities for meaningful employment should be a
priority in the inclusive economy.
New Zealand’s unemployment and labour market participation record is reasonably
good, but it lags behind that in some other OECD countries, suggesting that it could be
improved.  Unemployment rates of Mäori and Pacific Island populations are
significantly higher.Towards an Inclusive Economy      9
One of the keys to high employment is steady and predictable economic growth.
However, cross-country evidence suggests that several types of micro-level policy
interventions – wage setting regulations, tax-benefit policies, benefit administration
and some active labour market policies – are also potentially effective in combination
in generating improved labour market outcomes.  There is a need to ensure that the
current balance of effort is correct.
In addition, policy should focus on barriers facing particularly disadvantaged groups,
and the impact of more work on the time people have available for effective parenting
and family life.
Geography
Geography – or the location of activity and people – is another important
consideration.
While increasing urbanisation and globalisation are vital for economic growth and
productivity, there may also be downsides.  The benefits of urbanisation may be
reduced by problems with low well-being neighbourhoods arising from so-called
“neighbourhood effects” (where there are negative spillovers caused by groups of less
well-off people living together) and the high adjustment costs often involved in moving
from a declining region to a growing one.  The predominance of Mäori and Pacific
Island people in these neighbourhoods is also a concern.
Government can intervene in three ways.  First it can implement national policies that
do not have a regional intent, but do have a regional impact.  The key concern here is
to ensure that these policies do not have a dysfunctional effect when viewed from a
regional perspective.
Second, it can intervene through place-based policies (policies aimed directly at
assisting particular locations).  While some such policies can be effective, there is a
need to be cautious, particularly with any that require significant funding.  The costs
of supporting any such policies are a drag on those regions not being assisted.
Typically, a better approach is through people-based policies aimed at helping people
to adjust to regional disparities.  In deprived regions it is crucial to enhance choices
by facilitating mobility – policy should focus on initiatives such as job search
assistance and relocation assistance.  Currently there are no significant such schemes
in New Zealand.
Emphasis might also be placed on policies with both a people and a place component
such as education, including the better governance of local schools, skills
development, or low-cost policies that enhance community participation and
inter-relationships.
While connectedness with the rest of the world is crucial for maintaining high
standards of living, it has also posed major challenges, such as:
•The impact of increasing international competition for skilled labour on the wages
earned in New Zealand by such labour.10      Towards an Inclusive Economy
•The limits thereby placed on the ability of government to undertake tax-benefit
redistribution.
•The strains globalisation places on perceptions of national identity and economic
sovereignty.
Institutions and values
Public institutions (such as the parliamentary system or the school system) provide the
broad framework within which politics, society and the economy function, and
therefore have major impacts on the well-being of New Zealanders.  Shared or
mutually respected values (such as tolerance and trust) can also impact positively on
both social and economic relations.  Institutions and values interact – for instance,
voluntary compliance with the law supports the institutions that define and enforce
the law, and vice versa.
While New Zealand enjoys a good reputation internationally for the quality of its
public sector governance, there are a number of risks in this area that have
implications for the economy and democracy.  These include the increasing
international exposure of society and the economy to countries in which corruption is
the norm or widely tolerated; the absence of some safeguards against self-serving
behaviour within government; and the scope for conflicts of interest given our small
size.
Greater accountability is also needed for the outcomes of government spending with
regard to effectiveness and cost-effectiveness.
There are potential gains to be made in social capability, economic growth and
well-being by focusing on Mäori governance and on capacity building to complement
the existing Treaty of Waitangi settlements process.
The current review of the Local Government Act (LGA) 1974 raises important
questions about the degree of centralisation in the administration of the country’s
affairs and the relative benefits of decentralisation and devolution.  Any fundamental
change in the powers, accountability and funding of local government should be
preceded by an in-depth comparative review of recent experiences in New Zealand
with devolution and decentralisation.
The importance of maintaining ethical standards suggests the possible introduction of
a code of conduct for Parliamentarians, covering issues such as conflicts of interest,
public disclosure of private interests, and acceptance of gifts and hospitality.  Similar
provisions might apply in local government.
Given the relative size of the assets and funding under control of statutory bodies in
New Zealand and the consequent importance of technical competency of board
members, it would be timely to strengthen procedures requiring appointment on merit.Towards an Inclusive Economy      11
There is also growing recognition that the effective functioning of politics, the
economy and society depends to some extent on the existence of a core set of mutually
respected values, which in turn suggests further consideration should be given to what
role governments should have in fostering and reinforcing these social norms.
The compulsory education curriculum is one of the few mechanisms by which
government may influence the formation of social norms and values.  Greater
emphasis on values important for New Zealand’s social capability and economic
performance, and on key elements of New Zealand’s institutional environment could
be considered.
Conclusions
It is not the purpose of this report to develop detailed policy recommendations.
However, our research and analysis indicate a clear objective for government –
raising well-being for all – and a high-level plan for how to go about it:
•Growth is very important and policy should take care not to undermine the
productivity and dynamism of a healthy market economy.  But the need for social
cohesion means that the social consequences of growth should be predicted and built
into policy thinking.
•Many of the problems we want to solve through moving towards a more inclusive
economy are a result of individuals and households having low absolute levels of
income.  Low skills and levels of education typically drive this.  New Zealand has a
poor comparative record in education outcomes in the lower part of the distribution,
particularly among Mäori and Pacific people, compared to its generally good
performance in the upper half.  This needs to be remedied.
•While necessary as a short-term safety net, the tax-benefit transfer system is not a
realistic or desirable option to tackle in a sustainable way the problem of low
absolute levels of income.
•An “active” approach to raising low incomes through policies that improve
education and labour market opportunities in the lower part of the distribution
offers the best prospect to make a difference to distributional outcomes over the
medium term, and should be given a high priority – particularly as they have the
potential to increase both economic growth and social participation.
•Identifying specific education and labour market policies as strategic priorities
would enable the Government to rank the demands on its scarce fiscal resources,
and, in the medium term, to articulate an agenda of steady progress to increasing
well-being for all.
•There is a range of institutional reforms that offer the prospect of sound returns, at
little cost.  They include: improving accountability for the results of government
activities; strengthening Mäori institutions and governance; and initiatives to
strengthen ethical safeguards in public institutions.12      Towards an Inclusive Economy
•One issue that has emerged as important across a range of areas is improved
understanding of the effects of government policies.  Improving the evidence base
for government policy will require improving the effectiveness of research and
evaluation activities across the public sector.
•There are a number of areas that are suggested for further investigation. These
include improving our understanding of the causes and obstacles to regional
migration in New Zealand, together with the right mix of people-based and
place-based interventions to deal with regional disparities; a review of recent New
Zealand experience with devolution of decision making and decentralisation of
public services’ delivery, as a precursor to any decisions on fundamental changes in
the role of local government in New Zealand; and the possible value of further
emphasising mutually respected values through the education curriculum.
Finally, a key insight of this project is that there are a small number of crucial policy
areas where there appear to be opportunities for significant gains in equity and
participation, while being neutral or even positive for growth.  The areas are
education and jobs in the lower part of the distributions of attainment and skills;
Mäori institutions and governance; and improving understanding and reporting of the
results of government action.  These areas should receive increased government
attention.Towards an Inclusive Economy      13
1 Introduction
This paper forms part of Treasury’s reporting on its Key Priority 3, “An Inclusive
Economy”, one of four key priority areas for 2000/01.  It presents a framework for
considering broad policy options in terms of their potential for positive and mutually
reinforcing linkages between a productive economy and various characteristics of
society, with the ultimate objective of improving the well-being of all New Zealanders.
Three other Treasury papers enlarge on particular aspects of our inclusive economy
work: Treasury (2001a) Human Capital and the Inclusive Economy,  Treasury (2001b)
Geography and the Inclusive Economy: A Regional Perspective and Treasury (2000)
Framework for Closing the Gaps.
An inclusive economy provides well-being to New Zealanders by ensuring there are
broad-based opportunities for people to participate in society and the economy –
thereby opening up the key routes to improved well-being.  The objective of the
government in such an economy is to improve well-being by ensuring that policy is
directed to these ends.
The focus on “inclusiveness” derives from the importance, as both an end and a
means, of that participation.  The desired end is encapsulated in one of the
Government’s stated goals – to grow an inclusive, innovative economy for the
benefit of all.
In terms of means, there is no doubt that economic participation is a key channel
through which individuals achieve well-being.  Higher incomes expand opportunities
and choice, and provide the basis for participation in society.  Having a job also
contributes directly to well-being through the sense of self-esteem and sociability that
it provides.
There is equally no doubt that individual well-being derives from a number of factors
in addition to income. People’s participation in social networks, community life,
political choices and civil society are also key means through which they achieve well-
being.  Survey evidence suggests that both happy family relationships and material
resources are important to individual well-being.  The quality of the natural
environment is also important.
The social cohesion and connectedness that arise from participation in turn impact
favourably on economic performance.  A society of people that enjoys high levels of
participation, interconnection and cohesion is defined in this project as possessing a
high level of “social capability”.  Social capability can be thought of as the ability of a
society to co-operate towards the attainment of socially beneficial outcomes.  Social
capability depends on the effective functioning of institutions that span the realm of14      Towards an Inclusive Economy
the coercive institutions of the state, the voluntary institutions of civil society, the
affection-based institutions of the family, and the informal co-ordinating
“institutions” of social mores and values.
An important aspect of inclusion is the way that society behaves towards potentially
disadvantaged groups.  An inclusive economy is one that facilitates the participation
of people with physical and mental disabilities, ethnic minorities, immigrants etc in
work, in the community and in other ways. When individuals or groups face barriers
to participation, a key policy issue is whether, how and how much the Government can
play a useful role in providing opportunities to overcome these barriers.
Inclusiveness does not mean a dull uniformity.  Diversity is important both as freedom
for people to express their individuality or cultural aspirations, and instrumentally to
make New Zealand a more interesting and stimulating place to live, facilitate new
ideas and innovative behaviour, foster competition, raise productivity, and open new
markets.  However a core of overarching community norms is needed, for example
respecting the values and rights of others.
A fundamental insight of our inclusive economy work is that it is important to take full
account of the rich and complex set of linkages between the social capability elements
of well-being and the economic growth elements.  But the work also needs to recognise
that social capability literature is in its infancy, with many challenges ahead for
concept development, measurement, data collection and hypothesis testing.  Some
conclusions drawn from this literature are therefore tentative and we emphasise the
more robust of these in what follows.
This paper concentrates on identifying and illustrating the key linkages, and on
analysing their application to New Zealand’s current economy and society.  The
approach is based on combining standard economic knowledge about the causes of
growth with insights based on the much newer literature on social capital and
capability1.
Section 2 of the paper outlines our inclusive economy framework and describes the
key linkages.  Section 3 draws out some key messages based on the policy
interventions that evidence shows can influence well-being, taking into account New
Zealand’s current situation.  These messages are grouped within several broad
themes.  In section 4, the paper reaches conclusions about the broad policy direction
that emerges from the framework and these themes.  It also identifies where further
work would be likely to pay off.
1 This literature includes contributions from sociology, political science, anthropology and psychology as well as economics. The 1988
article by American sociologist James Coleman, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital” (Coleman (1988) is widely credited with
initiating the recent literature on social capital.Towards an Inclusive Economy      15
2 A Basic Framework for an Inclusive
Economy
The following diagram depicts the three main components of our inclusive economy
framework and the linkages between them:
 
Well-being 
arising from consumption of goods and services, family, 
health, job, security, community, freedoms and 
opportunities 
Productive capability  
arising from inputs of labour, capital 
and technology, and productivity 
Social capability  
arising from norms, values, trust, 
institutions, networks, human capital 
The framework represents a simplification of the complex set of factors that combine
and interact to produce people’s well-being.  For example, although the arrows run in
only one direction from the upper two boxes to the well-being box, in reality well-being
to some extent impacts back on productive and social capability.  A more detailed
diagram that reproduces more of the subtlety of the complex underlying reality can be
found in Annex A.
The key simplifications and insights afforded by the framework are:
•Social capability influences economic performance through values, trust,
interpersonal skills, networks and institutions, and their impacts on contracting,
risk-taking, incentives, innovation and economic participation.
•Economic performance – in the form of output of goods and services – in turn
influences social capability through the impact of economic change on cohesion,
institutions and values, opportunities for participation, learning from experience,
and increased public and private spending.
•The two-way nature of the linkages between social capability and economic
performance alerts us to the possibility of feedback loops, virtuous or vicious circles,
and multiple equilibria (in the simplest case “good” versus “bad” equilibria).  A
simple example is trust leading to voluntary exchanges and good economic
outcomes that in turn reinforce the original trust.16      Towards an Inclusive Economy
•A policy initiative can potentially influence well-being via a number of different
channels and mechanisms, some more direct than others.  To give a full picture, an
analysis of the initiative needs to examine the most important of these2.
We have examined the contents of each “box” in the framework and the nature of the
linkages between the boxes.  The following summarises the key findings.
2.1 Productive capability
The economy’s productive capability generates a flow of goods and services that are
the key determinant of a country’s average material standard of living.  The
distribution of these goods and services (and income) across households is also an
important influence on overall well-being.
The level and rate of growth of aggregate production, income and wealth are
determined by the normal factors of production, by the incentives that participants in
the economy face, and by the capability of the economy to take advantage of new
opportunities and manage shocks.
There is much international evidence on what drives good economic performance.
This shows that New Zealand starts with the disadvantages of small population size,
geographical isolation and a resource-based economy.  These features tend to be
associated with below-average economic performance.  There are a number of things
New Zealand can try to do to offset these disadvantages.  Sound economic
performance rests on getting a lot of things right.  The list of key ingredients that
policy can influence includes:
•Availability of resources:  labour, skills, capital (education, training, immigration,
raising participation, reducing unemployment).
•Conditions that facilitate well-informed and secure contracting (macro-economic
stability, property rights, rule of law, good governance, flexible markets).
•Conditions that facilitate and encourage innovation, technology transfer,
entrepreneurship, efficiency and responsiveness to change (openness, competition,
and regulation that facilitates but does not stultify competition and market
exchanges).
•Regional, trade and foreign policies that facilitate access to the benefits of large
population and markets elsewhere in the world and limit the disadvantages of
isolation.
•Conditions conducive to increased savings and high-quality investment.
•Fiscal responsibility (sound finances, moderate size of public sector, high-quality
spending).
2 Annex B contains examples of using the framework to conduct this sort of multi-channel analysis.Towards an Inclusive Economy      17
2.2 Social capability
A country’s social capability refers to its collection of skills, values, community
characteristics and networks, norms, institutions etc that not only contribute directly
to well-being but also influence the output of goods and services, for example, by
reducing the costs of business transactions.  We use social capability as an
overarching concept that depends positively on levels of human capital, well
functioning institutions, social cohesion and connectedness, and negatively on the
extent of social exclusion of particular individuals and groups.  Some aspects of social
capability are captured in the increasingly popular term “social capital”.  However,
there are varying interpretations and variants of social capital.  Coleman (1988), for
example, identifies a number of forms including:
•Obligations, expectations and trustworthiness of structures.  The existence of
informal reciprocal obligations between people creates an asset that can be drawn
on when needed.
•Information channels.  Individuals can obtain valuable information as a by-product
of participation in social activities.
•Norms and effective sanctions.  By encouraging certain types of behaviour and
discouraging others, norms make possible some sorts of (generally socially valuable)
activities such as voluntary compliance with paying taxes or meeting the
responsibilities that go with receiving cash and in-kind benefits from the community.
Woolcock (1998) identifies another dimension of social capital according to the
“reach” of the social relationships that individuals experience.  People have
expanding and overlapping layers of relationships and networks, starting with family
and extending out to include the local community and community groups, iwi and
häpu, broader cultural or ethnic groups, civil society organisations, and the formal
institutions of the state.
People typically have “strong ties” within family, or other cohesive, tightly knit groups
to which they belong (kin groups, clan, gang) and “weak ties” with broader
community or work-related groups (iwi, voluntary organisations, trade unions,
professional groups).  Strong ties contribute to well-being via support and sense of
identity (“bonding” social capital). They can also foster smaller-scale commercial
activities.  Weak ties (“bridging” social capital) foster broader community links and
provide information channels for more broadly based economic opportunities and co-
operation.
The presence of bonding social capital may add to or detract from bridging social
capital.  The latter occurs when the strong ties are exclusive in character and do not
encourage or even allow participation outside the close-knit group, therefore
damaging overall social capability.  A specific example is that in some cases a
traditional family structure will inhibit innovation and personal development of, say,
its female members.  Other instances of social capital can also have negative effects
e.g. the anti-social culture of a criminal gang, or the exclusion of outsiders by a closed
organisation.18      Towards an Inclusive Economy
Part of the negative impact on social capability of a group like a gang is that it feels
no allegiance to, and may explicitly reject, the broader society within which it exists.
Etzioni (2000) uses the term “community of communities” to describe the opposite
situation where shared “core values” across society mean that a diverse collection of
smaller groups – including different ethnic and cultural groups – is all part of a
broader national (and international) community.  This nesting of smaller groups
within an overarching “community” contributes to social cohesion and capability.
“Human capital” is “acquired human capabilities, which are durable traits, yielding
some positive effects upon performance in socially valued activities” (David, 2001).
We have included it in the social capability “box” for two reasons:
1) People’s values, social knowledge and social skills are a component of their human
capital and these things clearly contribute to social capability.
2) Education has a strong empirical association with trust, networks and various
forms of social participation.
On the other hand, vocational skills and technical knowledge – also important aspects
of human capital – fit better in the box relating to goods and services output.  A fuller
representation of the framework would bring out more clearly this dual nature of
human capital.
2.3 Well-being
Economic participation is a key channel through which individuals achieve well-being.
Increased income and assets expand opportunities and choice towards whatever ends
people may desire, such as recreational activities, maintaining personal relationships,
or development of spirituality or cultural identity.  Income also provides the means to
purchase those goods and services that are needed for participation in society.  An
inability to do so is a key characteristic of poverty and social exclusion.  Economic
participation also contributes directly to well-being through the sense of self-esteem,
identity, self-confidence and sociability that it provides.  In addition, the ability to
participate in voluntary economic exchanges is widely seen as an important individual
right.
However, well-being derives from a number of factors in addition to income3.  These
include:
•Family and community ties.
•Health, education and employment.
3 For example, Oswald (1997) shows that increases in income, on average, yield small increases in people’s reported happiness or life
satisfaction in industrial societies.  However, those in the top income quartile across Europe are significantly more likely to report being
“very happy” than those in the bottom quartile  (Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald, 2001).  Being in work, happily married, healthy and well
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•Security.
•Freedom and ability to pursue the things that people have reason to value.
•Social and cultural participation and identity.
•Quality of the physical environment4.
An individual’s well-being also depends on the state of the wider society in which they
live.  It is likely to depend on factors such as:
•Social cohesion and inclusion.
•Widely available opportunities.
•Trust among people and groups.
•Shared and/or mutually respected sets of values.
•Absence of significant poverty.
•A rich culture.
•Good governance structures – democracy, accountability, transparency, rule of law.
•High-quality public goods and services.
The above description of well-being emphasises both the processes (such as
democracy) and the desirable outcomes that people hope to attain in their lives5.  The
Nobel laureate Amartya Sen has recently set out an influential exposition of this type
of approach to well-being in his book Development as Freedom (Sen, 1999).
Essentially Sen proposes that well-being should be judged by the extent to which
individuals possess various kinds of “freedoms”.  These are people’s opportunities and
capabilities to live the kind of life they have reason to value.
The focus is not just on particular end-states or outcomes.  Neither is it about people
being passive recipients of those outcomes.  Rather, it is about individuals acting and
bringing about change, where the achievement can be judged in terms of their own
values and objectives.  The freedoms are important ends in themselves: for Sen,
long-asked questions such as “are political and civil liberties conducive to
development?” are misconceived.  They constrain “development” to a narrow focus on
material output. Such liberties should be seen as ends in themselves, not requiring any
further justification on the basis of their instrumental effects on other outcomes, such
as economic growth.
4 Environmental quality is an important element of well-being.  For example, clean air, clean water and the absence of toxic emissions
contribute directly to the quality of life.  In addition, environmental resources contribute indirectly to well-being through their value as
inputs to production. The complex linkages between the environment, economic output, social capability and well-being are beyond the scope
of this report – they are being covered in separate work across the government on sustainable development.  In very general terms, however,
while there appears to be some scope for policies that aim at both enhanced environmental quality and higher economic output, trade-offs will
often be required. The degree of uncertainty often present about environmental impacts and the long time horizons involved make this a
particularly difficult area of policy, involving issues of inter-generational fairness and concerns about the possibility of irreversible
environmental effects.
5 A similar approach relating specifically to New Zealand can be found in Royal Commission on Social Policy (1988), Vol. II, p.450.20      Towards an Inclusive Economy
Sen identifies five different freedoms:
1) Political freedoms – democratic systems with freedom of expression and
organisation, and a free media.
2) Economic facilities – the opportunities that individuals enjoy to utilise economic
resources for consumption, production or exchange.
3) Social opportunities – social arrangements for education, health care and so on
which influence individuals’ substantive freedom to live better lives.
4) Transparency guarantees – the freedom to deal with one another under guarantees
of disclosure and lucidity (important to preventing corruption and other underhand
dealings).
5) Protective security – a social safety net for the poor and vulnerable, comprising on-
going institutions and ad hoc emergency measures.
Sen also demonstrates that such freedoms are also critically important as means to
the achievement of social development, in the form of economic growth and
improvements in the quality of life. He assembles empirical evidence on the
connections between freedoms of various kinds, and a variety of social outcomes.
“Political freedoms (in the form of free speech and elections) help to promote
economic security.  Social opportunities (in the form of education and health
facilities) facilitate economic participation.  Economic facilities (in the form of
opportunities for participation in trade and production) can help to generate
personal abundance as well as public resources for social facilities.  Freedoms of
different kinds can strengthen one another.” (Sen, 1999, p.11).
Our approach is similar to Sen’s although the vocabulary is different.  The key ideas
are that well-being is more than material living standards, certain freedoms are
intrinsically valuable, and these freedoms are also instrumentally powerful, via their
linkages with each other, in producing desirable development outcomes.
2.4 Linkages between social capability, economic performance and well-being
There are direct linkages between social capability, economic performance and
material and social well-being.  As previously mentioned, the effects are often
mutually reinforcing or involve feedback loops.  This raises the possibility of virtuous
or vicious circles, and the possibility of good and bad equilibria.  Good understanding
of the nature of the linkages is therefore important.  The following paragraphs
illustrate some of the links in each direction between social capability and economic
performance (goods and services output).
Social capability and economic performance impact on each other
•Social capability directly affects economic performance. For example:
- The ability to adjust to economic shocks decreases with social division (Rodrik,
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- The effective rule of law increases investment by improving the incentives to
invest and save (World Bank, 2000).
- Transparency and good public sector governance improve resource allocation,
reduce resources being wasted on lobbying, reduce the incidence of poor public
policy, and promote earlier adjustments to emerging problems (Kaufmann,
Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón, 2000).
- Trust and co-operation (positive reciprocity) ease the burden on the
institutional structure and reduce transaction costs (Knack and Keefer, 1997;
La Porta et al, 1997).
- Interpersonal linkages facilitate labour market participation and matching,
innovation, and diffusion of knowledge and best practice (Saxenian, 1994;
Fountain, 1997).
- “Strong ties” can contribute to or detract from “weak ties” that are important
for economic development.  For example, immigrants from the Pacific Islands
(particularly the older generation) tend to have extensive “strong ties” but
almost nonexistent “weak ties” into other communities (personal
communication D. Robinson, May 2001).
- The degree of income inequality can be negative or positive for growth
depending on a number of factors such as its impact on incentives, education
and fertility decisions and political support for reforms (OECD, 2001b;
Annex B).
•Economic performance affects social capability both positively and negatively.  For
example:
- Economic growth generally increases opportunities for active participation in
the economy, mainly via the labour market.  Relationships formed at and
through work are an important element of people’s social networks.
- Economic growth tends to generate a constituency of support for the
institutions and policies responsible for growth, and thereby helps build social
cohesion (Galt, 2000).
- Participation in voluntary market exchanges can promote the development of
important social norms (trust, reliability, honesty) that smooth broader social
interactions (Sen, 1999).
- Economic growth generates additional tax revenues that fund public
expenditure on things like education and social protection that promote social
capability.
- Growth often creates winners and losers as resources shift from declining to
expanding sectors, skill categories or regions.  This means that the fruits of
growth can turn out to be unevenly distributed, with particular individuals and
groups suffering relative or absolute losses alongside others who experience22      Towards an Inclusive Economy
rapidly improving fortunes.  This can cause social tension and divisions.
Unless governments manage these changes well, this can lead to opposition to
further change and policy reversals (Rodrik, 2000).
- Globalisation and greater openness (important drivers of growth) tend to place
strains on the social fabric via increased volatility (e.g. in the demand for
certain types of labour) and via the challenge that foreign norms and
ownership of businesses create for local culture and norms (Rodrik, 2000).
Globalisation and openness increase the mobility of capital and skilled labour
and so limit government efforts to enhance social capability.
- Globalisation and greater openness may also have positive social impacts such
as more tolerance of diversity and a more dynamic culture (Fukuyama, 1999).
Thus, social capability and economic performance impact on each other.  In addition,
both impact on well-being.  Positive linkages in each direction clearly have the
potential to generate virtuous (or vicious) circles, and win-win opportunities for policy.
This insight is a distinctive and novel part of the “inclusive economy” framework and
leads to a wider focus for policy analysis – as the next section will illustrate.  On the
other hand, the negative linkages imply potential trade-offs so that, for example, a
policy that boosted growth might be at the expense of some aspect of social capability.
In turn there would be both positive and negative effects on well-being with the net
effect depending on their relative sizes. So it is important to consider the factors that
influence economic performance, and their positive or negative impacts on social
capability, and vice versa.Towards an Inclusive Economy      23
Box 2.1: Health outcomes in an inclusive economy
Health is an important contributor to, and element in, most definitions of well-being both at the individual
and societal level.  For this reason, most of the policy themes discussed later in this paper which are
articulated in terms of their positive contribution to overall well-being are likely to have more specific
positive impacts on health.  For example, there is strong evidence of positive effects on mental health for
individuals who obtain a job after a period of unemployment (Jenkins, 2001).
Research on the determinants of the relative healthiness of populations has long recognised the complex
causal interplay between social capability and material living standards in influencing health outcomes.
It is recognised that many of the most important factors shaping the health of communities lie far outside
the domain of the health services delivery system.  Rather they lie in the socio-economic circumstances
of people, including the characteristics of the areas where they live (Marmot and Wilkinson, 1999).
Therefore, effective health-promoting policy should focus at least as much on the material living standards
of the least well off, particularly their children, their level of educational attainment and the social
networks and supports present in communities, as on improving access to timely and appropriate preventive
and curative health services.
That said, there is also evidence that well-organised public services (not just health services) and
infrastructure can improve health even in poor areas and complement other policies.  For example, the
Kerala state in India has far better health outcomes than its per capita income would predict.  This is
generally attributed to the province’s strong commitment over many years to public health, basic primary
health services and mass education, including an emphasis on women’s literacy (Sen, 1999).
A similar example is provided by Britain’s health experience during two World Wars.  Mortality rates
among non-combatants fell sharply despite a reduction in the per capita availability of many resources
including food.  The most likely explanation relates to the noticeable increase in public provision of
universal social services and a more equitable distribution of basic commodities, especially food, reducing
under-nourishment among the poorest (Sen, 1999).  This suggests that improving the prospects and
living standards of the least well off is likely to be positive for health and wider well-being.24      Towards an Inclusive Economy
Box 2.2: Housing in an inclusive economy
In an inclusive economy, housing policy is concerned with more than simply ensuring that people have
access to an adequate, sheltering physical space, since it is apparent that housing has important
consequences for both social capability and well-being, and the economy.
For example:
• Damp and cold housing is associated with poor respiratory health, especially among children
(Howden-Chapman et al, 1996).
• Overcrowding is associated with higher rates of a number of infectious diseases in childhood
(Howden-Chapman et al, 1996; McNicholas, Lennon et al, 2000).
• Overcrowding has been put forward as a contributory factor in some children’s poor educational
attainment, because of its effect on the ability to find quiet space for homework.
• Different types of housing (single dwellings in streets, apartment buildings etc) have been found
to be associated with different patterns of social interaction and sociability in neighbourhoods
(Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001).
• Different types of housing have been found to be associated with different levels of crime in
neighbourhoods because of the opportunities which different physical lay-outs offer for undetected
criminal behaviour.
• Owner occupied housing has been identified as positively associated with a higher level of civic
participation on the grounds that owner occupiers have a “stake” in their community (Glaeser
and Sacerdote, 2001).
• Home owning as against renting may lead to greater inflexibility in the labour market if
workers find it difficult to sell their homes in order to be able to move to places where jobs are
available.
• House design and home amenities can have a major bearing on whether disabled or frail older
people are able to live in the community and remain integrated with the rest of society.
Viewed in the light of these examples, housing policy is another domain in which economic and social
policy concerns are best analysed in an integrated, inclusive way.  Poor housing is likely to be caused by
prior disadvantage – for instance low skills and low earnings capacity – that, at the same time and
independently, leads to other poor outcomes.  Thus, problems that are associated with poor housing may
be due to other causes, and improved housing may not solve the problem (Mayer, 1997).  Also, even
when poor housing contributes to poor outcomes, other policies, such as immunisation and homework
centres, may be more effective as solutions.
In the next section we discuss what we think are the more important areas of policy opportunity based on
empirical evidence of what is most likely to work to promote inclusive economy goals, and relevance to
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3 Key Messages for Shaping Policy on the
Inclusive Economy
In this section we group key messages for shaping policy on the inclusive economy
under a number of themes.  They represent broad policy areas that theory and
evidence taken together strongly indicate are important in building a more inclusive
economy, taking New Zealand’s current situation as a starting point.  We discuss the
themes in the context of our framework in order to bring out how their relationship to
well-being works through both economic and social mechanisms and the interactions






3.1 Growth and distribution
The well-being of New Zealanders is vitally linked to our ability to achieve and sustain
a steady rate of growth in our national income6.  A continuously rising level of national
income per head:
•Represents additional purchasing power that is available to acquire goods and
services to consume (a central component of material well-being), and to save and
invest to provide future growth.
•Seems to be associated with a similar rate of increase in incomes of the poor (Dollar
and Kraay, 2001).
•Creates additional jobs, expanding the opportunities for fuller employment and
greater participation particularly of poorer people (Freeman, 2001).
•Can help avoid New Zealanders’ living standards slipping relative to those of other
comparable countries, thus avoiding the risk that too many people will choose to
emigrate.
•Provides revenue to support important social expenditures without placing
additional strain on the rates of tax.
6 For the reasons discussed in Box 3.1, a better aggregate measure of the economy’s performance in delivering improved material well-
being is growth in Gross National Income per head.26      Towards an Inclusive Economy
•Provides greater room for policy and economic flexibility by permitting structural
improvements and relative price changes to occur without those adversely affected
necessarily having to take a drop in real income.
Thus, in looking for new and more effective ways to enhance well-being, we cannot
afford to overlook the basics – those elements of fiscal, monetary and regulatory
policy that are important for growth, stability and the efficient functioning of key
markets.
Box 3.1: GDP, GDP per head, and GNI per head
The most commonly used economic aggregates are Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and its growth rate.
These are not always good measures of material well-being, even on average, because they ignore
changes in population.  GDP per head and its growth rate are therefore better measures.  However, GDP
measures economic activity in New Zealand whether the activity is “owned” by foreigners or residents.
Likewise it ignores any income earned from offshore activities that are owned by New Zealand residents.
A measure that better reflects the income accruing on average to each New Zealand resident is therefore
Gross National Income (GNI) per head.
Fig 3.1 below shows the tracks of the three series over the past two decades and illustrates how they have
differed considerably from each other.  For example the two “per head” series dipped sharply in the
early 1990s whereas GDP did not.  This was due to an increased population growth rate coinciding with
low or slightly negative GDP growth at the time.  Currently available statistics do not capture the
incomes of New Zealanders resident overseas (except partially and indirectly via transfers from or to
them).  Whilst arguable, it seems unlikely that such incomes would be a policy concern for the New
Zealand Government.
The challenge is to draw on the insights of the best available theories and evidence on
what improves economic and social outcomes overall, rather than improving one at
excessive cost to the other.  This process needs to take account of New Zealand’s
particular institutions, values and history.
A good example of the challenge lies in the issue of income inequality.
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Along with a number of other developed countries, New Zealand has experienced
widening pre-tax incomes over the past two decades or so, mainly because
technological change has increased the demand for, and therefore the wages of,
skilled labour relative to unskilled (David, 2001; Acemoglu, 2001).
It has been conventionally believed that, while less income inequality might be socially
desirable, attempting to narrow the post-tax distribution of incomes is bad for
economic efficiency and growth.  Thus it seemed necessary to make a difficult
trade-off between the two desirable goals of economic growth and improving outcomes
for the worst off.  However, the linkages between income inequality and economic
growth have recently been the subject of considerable debate.  A number of theories
and empirical studies have been advanced that indicate that wide dispersion of
incomes is not necessarily good for growth and that a more equal distribution can be
beneficial (OECD, 2001b)7.
In light of this more recent evidence, it is tempting to conclude that one can achieve
both reduced inequality and growth without having to trade one against the other.
However, it is a serious over-simplification to believe that, where there is a large
disparity in people’s incomes, the tax and transfer system can be used to redistribute
from rich to poor without undermining the country’s growth prospects.  There are
several problems with this over-simplification:
“Passive” social spending, via taxes, income transfers and some
social services, is likely to harm incentives and jeopardise growth
The evidence from a recent cross-country study indicates that high levels of
taxes, transfers and social spending are associated with lower growth rates in
OECD countries (see Box 3.2).  Lower growth is bad for well-being because it is
associated with slower job growth and, in an open economy, a worsening pre-tax
income distribution (see discussion of globalisation below).
“Passive” income transfers alone are not sufficient to enhance
well-being
As discussed earlier, the concept of well-being relates to having a set of
freedoms and capabilities.  An increase in current transfer income provides a
means by which some choice can be exercised for the moment, but well-being is
multi-faceted and path-dependent.  In other words, it is influenced by people
and events around us and tends to evolve with us over our life as we exercise
choices, relate to others, gain skills, experience and other assets, or suffer
personal, family or financial losses.
Income-tested benefits are a key feature of our social security system since they
provide collective social insurance against adverse events.  However, income
transfers do not by themselves guarantee that those affected by adverse events
are back on a trajectory of evolving positive well-being.  For some, that is likely
7 Annex B highlights some of the different mechanisms linking inequality and growth.28      Towards an Inclusive Economy
to require much more: medical treatment; a network of supportive and stable
relationships; realistic options for achieving, and encouragement to achieve,
stable employment; and the contacts, motivation, knowledge and skills to pursue
them.
The availability of “passive” benefits without a well-designed gate-keeping
system leads to growth in numbers of welfare-dependent individuals and
families.  In addition, long periods of benefit receipt are associated with a range
of poor outcomes for both adults and their children8.  Finally, social cohesion
will suffer if taxpayers feel they are being asked unreasonably to support a
growing number of recipients of “passive” transfers.
Box 3.2: Linkages between growth, inequality and social protection
The most recent OECD study (OECD 2001b) on this topic reveals how complex are the linkages and how
difficult it is to interpret the empirical evidence.
The OECD started with a fairly standard model of the major determinants of growth for OECD countries
– human capital, investment in physical capital, population growth and a “catch-up” factor for countries
with lower initial incomes.  They then tested whether the degree of income inequality (after taxes and
transfers) could add further explanatory power.  The evidence was inconclusive, so they could not say
whether a wide distribution of final income was good or bad for growth.
Despite this inconclusive result regarding income distribution, the OECD found that greater levels of
government spending on social protection were associated with a poorer growth performance.  However,
they also found that it made a difference whether the social protection spending was “ active” or
“passive”.  “Active” policies they defined as those introduced to encourage increased employment by
the beneficiaries of such policies. They could therefore include a range of “active” labour market
policies as well as policies designed to reduce barriers to participation, such as child care assistance,
tax credits for low-income working families, and some forms of health protection.  “Passive” policies
were defined as pure transfers of consumption from one group in society to another9.
Using this distinction the OECD found that “active” social spending tended to promote growth, while
“passive” spending inhibited growth.
8 While there are strong associations between benefit receipt and a range of poor outcomes, it is less clear that benefit receipt itself is an
independent factor contributing to these.  See Boggess, Corcoran and Jenkins (1999).
9 Passive transfers include cash transfers and elements of health and other social services spending.  Any division of social protection
policies into active and passive will be imprecise.  Some mostly passive programmes have an active component – for example, job search
requirements for unemployment beneficiaries.  In addition, the recipients may use some of the transfer for active purposes, such as investing
in job search. Recent empirical research has found that when average incomes rise, the average incomes of the poorest fifth rise proportion-
ately.  This result holds across regions, periods, income levels and growth rates (Dollar and Kraay, 2001).  The focus should therefore be on
helping the poor while avoiding undermining the incentives for economic growth.Towards an Inclusive Economy      29
The pre-tax distribution of market incomes largely depends on the distribution of skills
in the population and the rate of non-employment.  “Active” policies aimed at
increasing skills and employment offer the best prospects for improving both
distributional and growth outcomes over time
As the next two sections discuss in more detail, the evidence shows that the
major influences on the pre-tax distribution of income are the distribution of
skills among the population, the differences in wage rates between skilled and
unskilled work (the skill premium), and the incidence of paid employment
(Acemoglu, 2001; O’Dea, 2000).  This suggests that a focus on education,
training and promoting participation in the labour market are the best routes to
reduce deprivation and poverty, without incurring the downsides of passive tax-
benefit redistribution.  OECD work (see Box 3.2) confirms that such “active”
forms of assistance are effective and do indeed promote rather than diminish a
country’s growth prospects.
An inclusive economy needs to produce fair outcomes, as judged from several
perspectives
There is a tendency to focus too much on the static distribution of after-tax
incomes and to infer that any increase in inequality measured that way is bad,
and any decrease good, for social equity.  However, income inequality measures
confuse two issues: improving income for the poor; and reducing income for the
rich.  A dynamic economy depends on rewarding individuals for innovating and
meeting consumer needs.  An economy that grows rapidly is likely to provide
benefits to the poor as well as the rest of society.
A more complete assessment should also take into account how incomes
translate into longer-term outcomes for people, families, population subgroups
and the nation as a whole.  It also needs to recognise that it is not wise to use
comparisons of current income as a proxy for comparisons of living standards,
because the former does not take into account factors like home ownership, the
opportunities people have and the different stages of life different people are at.
The above considerations require us to think carefully about how best to address
distributional and growth concerns.  We need to deal with the immediate concern for
social protection of today’s vulnerable people.  At the same time, we need to recognise
that providing opportunities of training and jobs – and expecting those getting welfare
benefits to take them – is as important as providing current income.  We need to
recognise that there is a trade-off between providing income support through
“passive” income transfers, and fostering the economic growth that will provide better
living standards for today’s poor tomorrow.  We also need to recognise that growth
depends on entrepreneurship, and accept high incomes justly earned.
Greater consensus among voters and taxpayers is needed on where to strike the
balance across these sometimes competing ends.  This inevitably requires value
judgements to be made.  However, these judgements need to be well informed, and
based on a better understanding of the costs and probabilities of success of different
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and public debate should lead to a clearer sense of what constitutes desirable
outcomes and the best means to achieve them.  This in turn should provide a stronger
mandate for policy settings that can be sustained over an extended period.
3.2 Human capital
Human capital is positively linked to well-being
There is strong and consistent evidence that human capital is positively associated
with well-being, both directly, and through raising economic performance and social
capability.  Across developed countries, an extra year of education is associated with
increased individual earnings of between 5% and 15% (Krueger and Lindahl, 2000).
The most recent OECD evidence (OECD, 2000b) shows that a one-year increase in
average years of schooling in the working-age population is associated with an
increase in output per capita of 6%10.  While there are thorny empirical issues
affecting the interpretation of these findings, there is a growing (but not universal)
consensus amongst economists that these associations mostly reflect a causal link
from education to productivity, income and growth (Temple, 2000).
In addition, evidence shows a positive association between education and a wide
range of other outcomes – including health, lower criminal offending, participation in
voluntary community activity, giving to charity, concern about equality of
opportunity, political participation, trust and direct measures of happiness.
Moreover, improving human capital in one generation appears to have positive
flow-on effects to the next; and raising the general level of education in a community
provides benefits to individuals in addition to those gained from their own education
(OECD, 2001b).  Again causal relationships are not always clear, but these probable
additional benefits should be taken into account in evaluating the contribution of
human capital policies to well-being.
Many important questions remain for policy
Within these very broad relationships many important questions remain for policy.
Human capital has many different dimensions, and is acquired in a wide variety of
settings – families, school, tertiary sector, on the job and in the community – and
through different means.  Empirical evidence often captures only a small part of this
complexity, or does so in a way that makes generalisation for broad national policy
difficult.  Particular questions include:
• Are the best human capital policies to increase economic growth also the best to
increase well-being on other dimensions, or is there a trade-off, particularly in
competing demands for society’s and government resources?  If so, can the trade-
off be evaluated to assist policy choices?
10 This is an average relationship across OECD countries.  Countries that already have high levels of education in the working-age
population have less scope to add years of education, and there are diminishing returns to extra education for such countries.Towards an Inclusive Economy      31
• Which level of education – early childhood, primary, secondary, post-compulsory –
should receive the most attention henceforth, and why?  What is the relative
importance of formal education, compared to other influences on human capital
formation – families, workplaces and community – and what does this suggest for
policy design and implementation?
• Given a strong role for private decisions by families, individual students, education
providers and firms, what is the appropriate role for governments?  What problems
should government involvement address?  What problems does that involvement
entail?  What sort of institutions and what regulatory, funding and financing
arrangements are best?
A companion paper, Human Capital and the Inclusive Economy (Treasury, 2001a),
aims to improve the basis for reasonable judgements on a number of these issues, in
the New Zealand context.
Economic growth is driven by technological innovation, creating an increasing
demand for skill, and, in many countries, a widening dispersion of incomes
As noted above, economists view economic growth as being driven primarily by
technological innovation11 – finding new and more efficient ways of producing existing
goods and services, and producing new types.  There is reasonably firm evidence that
over the last 80 years and particularly over the last 25, this technological progress has
created an increasing demand for skills (David, 2001).  It is the response to this
demand that has been primarily responsible for rising levels of education in OECD
countries.  Particularly over the last 25 years, this has played a significant role in the
widening of the distribution of income in a number of countries (Acemoglu, 2001).
However, there is no simple relationship between economic growth and earnings
inequality.  Much will depend on the circumstances of particular countries: the way in
which their industries are organised; labour market regulation and welfare policies;
the nature of formal and informal education and their linkages to industry; and the
quality and distribution of the existing stock of human capital.  In addition, increased
supply of skilled labour may, itself, induce further technological change.  Countries
show marked differences in both growth patterns and the trajectory of income
inequality over time12.
Nevertheless, it is likely that the faster the pace of skill-biased technological change,
the more likely there will be a widening dispersion of earnings.  Countries such as the
United States (and, apparently, New Zealand) that utilise a high-skill/low-skill mix of
labour inputs rather than a more uniform skill mix (Broadberry, 2000) are likely to be
more vulnerable to a widening dispersion in the face of rapid skill-biased
technological change.  This is partly because the current level of human capital in
families and communities has a strong effect on formation of human capital in the
11 In the broad sense, including organisational innovation.
12 See the previous section on Growth and distribution, and OECD (2001b).32      Towards an Inclusive Economy
next generation.  Moreover, much human capital is formed “on-the-job” – people who
have worked only in low-skilled jobs will find it more difficult to adapt to new skill-
biased technologies.
Human capital policies for growth or improved distributional outcomes?
Technological progress drives growth, and seems to require at least the following types
of capabilities (aspects of which are not acquired through formal education):
• People who have the high technical skills (in the appropriate areas) and creativity to
create or adopt new technologies – and behind this, people who have high levels of
generic skills that will enable them to learn efficiently specific technical skills
demanded by emerging technologies.
• People with the required entrepreneurial and management skills to identify
opportunities, organise the financing of investments, and design and manage new
ways of organising to make optimal use of new technologies.
• People with the skills to operate the new technology and to work effectively in the
new forms of organisation.  (While there is evidence that cognitive skills have
become more important, a range of other skills and qualities are also important,
including the ability to work in teams, to problem solve, and to adapt.)
On the other hand, the most effective human capital policies to address income
adequacy and income distribution concerns are likely to be aimed at raising the skills
of people in the bottom quintile of the distribution (Acemoglu, 2001).  This conclusion
is likely to be reinforced when considering other channels by which human capital
affects well-being.  For instance, the biggest effects on improving outcomes in health,
reducing crime, raising attainment in disadvantaged communities, increasing
community and political involvement and raising trust are also likely to be gained by
raising achievement in the bottom part of the distribution.
Improving skills on the bottom rungs of the distribution to address distributional
concerns will reduce the need to use other instruments (such as income transfers,
labour market regulation, and taxation) that, as we have seen, are likely to have
continuing adverse effects on economic growth13.
If the best human capital policies to improve the production of skills for growth are
different from those to raise incomes at the bottom of the distribution, and each
requires large amounts of extra resources, then clearly there will be a trade-off.  The
trade-off might be evaluated in terms of contributions to productivity and economic
growth, but other effects on well-being need to be taken into account, and, in the end,
equity objectives also need to be considered.  One guide to evaluating this potential
conflict is to compare the levels and distributions of human capital in similarly
developed countries.
13 See the previous section on Growth and distribution, and OECD (2001b).Towards an Inclusive Economy      33
New Zealand’s ranking in educational attainment and skills is mixed
New Zealand currently has very high rates of tertiary enrolment, and ranks fifth in
the OECD in terms of 17 year olds’ expected years of tertiary education.  On the other
hand, along with the United States and the United Kingdom, it ranks in the bottom
third for rates of participation in education of young people aged 16 through 18.  On a
range of internationally comparable measures of achievement, New Zealand (along
with other English speaking countries14) has a comparatively large proportion of
low-skilled people – both at school and in the adult population.  On the other hand,
New Zealand often ranks well in skill levels in the top half of the distribution.
This suggests that there is more scope to increase average years of education, and to
improve well-being directly, by focusing attention on the roughly 20% of young people
who leave school without a recognised qualification of any sort, and, in particular, the
roughly 15% of young people who leave school in the year that they turn 16.  (OECD
and Statistics Canada, 1997 and OECD, 2001a reach similar conclusions more
generally.  They point out that variations in skills and attainment across OECD
countries are much greater in the bottom part of the distribution than in the top.)
A further important dimension is the over-representation of Mäori and Pacific people
amongst those with low skills.  This increases the risk of damaging social
fragmentation, particularly to the extent that this is seen to be caused by social and
economic processes that unfairly disadvantage them.
Early interventions are likely to be the most cost-effective in the long run
There are two issues here – how to reduce the numbers of young people leaving
education without sufficient skills to secure stable employment, and how to improve
skills for those already in the workforce.  Because of the cumulative nature of
educational investments, early interventions in pre-school and primary education are
likely to be most cost-effective in the long run.
The period from birth (even pre-birth) to school age is a critical development phase
with life-long effects on well-being.  Intensive early childhood interventions can be
effective in improving a range of both short- and long-term outcomes for
disadvantaged children (Waldfogel, 1999).  Given that they are relatively expensive
(compared to regular early-childhood education), such interventions need to be
carefully designed in terms of the age of the child, their targeting on risk factors and
their mix of child-focused and parent-focused elements.  Intensive very early
interventions for children most at risk may be important, given the rapid brain
development that takes place in these years.  Targeting instruments are not perfect,
and it may be difficult to engage the most disadvantaged families.  Good quality
standard early childhood education also appears to have a beneficial effect, in
particular for disadvantaged children, but again it is difficult to ensure that the most
disadvantaged children access provision.  In addition, there is evidence that some of
the benefits – particularly in terms of cognitive skills – are lost, if subsequent primary
education is of insufficient quality (Nechyba et al, 1999).  Given this, primary
schooling is a key stage at which to address the risk of low achievement.
14 Although Australia recently has been doing better (Treasury, 2001a).34      Towards an Inclusive Economy
Of particular importance are foundation skills in literacy and numeracy that provide
the platform for later learning both in school and the workforce.  Such skills have
been shown to have a strong link with labour market success independent of levels of
education (OECD and Statistics Canada, 1997).
Many jurisdictions – for instance the United Kingdom, and many states in the United
States – have put increasing emphasis on the acquisition of literacy and numeracy
skills during elementary schooling.  For example, they have put in place standardised
measures of progress, at individual, school and national level.  A range of
interventions may be effective.  By and large, these will need to engage families and
communities in pursuing meaningful objectives for their children, recognising the
important contribution that each makes to children’s outcomes.  The Strengthening
Education in Mangere and Otara (SEMO) initiative is a promising recent New
Zealand example of such an approach (see Box 3.3).  A key issue is how to export
such an approach to other disadvantaged communities, given scarcity of skilled
human resources, and the costs involved.
Labour market and basic skills training for adults may also be useful
Addressing low levels of human capital in the adult population raises different issues.
First there is not strong evidence that pre-employment labour market training (such
as the New Zealand Training Opportunities Programme) is particularly effective in
securing better labour market and earnings outcomes.  In the short to medium term,
evidence supports concentrating on getting persistently unemployed people into work
as a first priority.  On the other hand, policies that concentrate on human capital
accumulation may eventually match “work first” policies in effectiveness, over the
longer term (Hotz, Imbens and Klerman, 2000).  In addition, human capital policies
may have important benefits both for individuals and their families, other than
improving labour market outcomes.  These need to be taken into account.
There may also be an increased role for improving the quality of training available for
the low skilled while they are in employment (Acemoglu, 200115).
More generally, people in the bottom 20% of the distribution of skills vary widely in
the characteristics that are associated with their low skills.  Some will not be able to
benefit from human capital policies in terms of improved labour market attachment,
but may nevertheless benefit for other reasons.
Overall, there is a need to get a better understanding of what policies are effective in
which circumstances and for whom.  This can only be achieved through
experimentation and good evaluation of policies as they are implemented in New
Zealand, and drawing on learning from other jurisdictions.
15 New Zealand appears to have very high rates of adult education and training, including that provided or financed by employers.  The
questions then are who benefits from such training, and what is the scope for policies to shift provision more to the initially unskilled,
without impairing efficiency?Towards an Inclusive Economy      35
Box 3.3: Strengthening Education in Mangere and Otara
The Strengthening Education in Mangere and Otara (SEMO) initiative began in 1997 in response to an
Education Review Office (ERO) report criticising the quality of education in many South Auckland
schools.  It aims to strengthen schools in Mangere and Otara by improving their capacity to manage
themselves.  The Ministry of Education provides extra assistance to this end.  SEMO’s design reflected
recent research on school improvement that emphasised the importance for sustained gains of involving
both schools and community groups.  Relevant resources (aspirations for children, understanding what
is needed to reach them and the skills to do so) are more likely to be identified and aligned through such
an approach.  The initiative worked within national education policy parameters, and the culture,
politics and recent educational history of Mangere and Otara.  It thus aimed to be a partnership
between the state and the local communities, families and schools.  Evaluation (Robinson et al, 2000)
showed that considerable obstacles (the historical pattern of relationships and expectations, suspicion of
state interventions, expectations of management autonomy, community loss of confidence in the local
schools) stood in the path of achieving partnership.  Over time, through learning from the feedback of
the various communities, schools and evaluators many of these obstacles have been overcome, resulting
in the establishment of effective partnerships.  The evaluators note the importance of SEMO activities
(which are complex and diverse) focusing on the central objective of sustainable improvement in students’
achievement.  Activities not so focused can wittingly or unwittingly divert the attention and effort that is
needed to achieve this goal.  SEMO has been successful in gaining community and schools’ support for
this goal.   A current activity in 13 schools is a programme of teacher professional development on the
analysis and use of student achievement data.  An evaluation of another component of SEMO, a teacher
development programme focused on teaching new entrants, indicated that it substantially improved the
chances of children from low-income families reaching national standards of literacy achievement.
New Zealand should improve selected areas of tertiary education
Empirical evidence lends support to models in which the tertiary sector plays a crucial
role in economic growth in developed economies, through the production of highly
skilled technical specialists, and top class managers.  Effective linkages between
tertiary education research, and research and development in industry, are also
important for economically relevant technology creation and adoption.  Much of the
knowledge and skills required are learned by “doing”, are “tacit”, and to a
significant extent are disseminated only through personal interactions.  Linkages
between New Zealand and international centres are important, for the same reason.
In addition, some economists (David, 2001) argue that there are important investment
co-ordination problems that create an opportunity for government intervention to
improve outcomes.  Skilled graduates and new technologies are complementary.  The
investments by students in time, by the tertiary sector in creating capacity for
producing graduates, and by firms in research and development and adoption of
technologies, all require each other in order to reap good economic returns.  This
suggests that a key government role is providing an environment that encourages
students, tertiary providers and industries to make complementary investments.36      Towards an Inclusive Economy
New Zealand has high rates of participation in tertiary education
New Zealand has been remarkably successful in rapidly increasing output of tertiary
graduates over the last 15 years, while keeping real government outlays tightly
constrained.  This has been achieved through funding tertiary institutions almost
entirely on the basis of student numbers, with students expected to contribute a part
of tuition costs (able to be financed through student loans).  The funding includes a
national element to cover research – but does not provide strong incentives for
excellence in research.
Quality assurance systems are designed to ensure tertiary providers exceed minimum
standards.  The main mechanism that mediates responsiveness of provision to the
needs of the economy is student demand for courses, which in turn is dependent, at
least to an extent, on differences in labour market returns to educational investments.
Certainly high private rates of return to tertiary education appear to have been a
significant driver of increased participation in New Zealand.
New Zealand competes in an international labour market for the most skilled
academic workers
However, New Zealand is a small, remote, open economy that operates in an
international labour market for the most skilled workers.  It is competing with a
number of higher-income countries for the best academic workers.  It is very unlikely
that policies that aim at a uniform standard across the tertiary system will reliably
produce world-class centres of research and teaching – no country has the resources
to afford a uniformly world-class standard of provision in its universities.
Thus the challenge for tertiary education in its contribution to growth in New Zealand
is not one of further raising participation rates, but of improving quality and
relevance to the needs of the economy.  It is important to be cautious on this point –
the New Zealand economy is very different in its structure to other OECD economies –
particularly in its reliance on agricultural commodities.  It does not follow that
producing science and engineering graduates, for instance, in the same proportions as
in Germany, the United States or the United Kingdom would be beneficial for
growth16.
Careful funding and institutional design are required to increase the incidence of
world-class tertiary research and teaching in an affordable way
While some recognised centres of excellence in research and training do exist, it is
possible that a careful choice of funding and institutional arrangements could lead to
the emergence of more, in areas of particular relevance to economic growth.
Encouraging selected areas of world-class provision requires internationally
competitive salaries and levels of funding.  Building on emerging centres of
excellence, particularly where they can demonstrate effective linkages with
16 It is worth noting, however, that, at least in the broad data, New Zealand appears to produce science and engineering graduates at a
comparable rate to Australia, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom (OECD 2000c, Tables C4.2 and C4.3a).  At the same time,
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relevant industries, could reduce the risk of wasted resources.  Internationally, it is
not uncommon for research centres (often associated with teaching) to be funded
through a tendering process that provides sufficient continuity to allow strategic
investments to be made, but which also provides strong incentives for performance.
New Zealand can support only a limited number of such centres.  However, they could
play a significant role in the identification and adoption of new technologies (and, in
some areas, the creation of new technologies) by attracting and retaining top staff
and students, and building linkages with industry across which knowledge can be
transferred17.  The particular design of institutions and funding arrangements are
likely to be important for giving industry, students and tertiary staff the confidence to
make the investments that will yield productivity gains in the longer term.  A degree
of experimentation may be required to find the best policies.
Summary
Policies aiming to increase the incidence of world-class tertiary education and
research relevant to industry need not require large additions to existing publicly
provided resources.  The policies involve only a small part of all tertiary provision, and
high private rates of return provide strong incentives for individual students to
contribute their own resources (assisted by the student loan scheme).  More selective
funding, coupled with suitable institutional arrangements, could lead to significant
improvements18.
On the other hand, determined efforts to reduce the incidence of low skills among new
entrants to the working-age population are likely to require significant additional
resources – but again careful work is required to identify the most cost-effective
policies.  There is substantial evidence that interventions during childhood and
adolescence can be very effective in raising skills. Much less is known about the
capacity to raise basic skills in the adult population – suggesting a cautious approach,
with expansion dependent on successful evaluation.  Recent work in the United
Kingdom (Bynner et al, 2001) suggests that where these interventions raise skills, they
are likely to have substantial benefits not only for the individuals concerned, but also
for social outcomes, productivity, economic growth and requirements for public
spending.
3.3 Jobs
Having a job is important for well-being
Job loss and the experience of unemployment are known from many studies to have a
strongly negative impact on personal well-being, particularly their impact on mental
health and adverse psychosocial outcomes (e.g. drug and alcohol abuse).  These
effects are independent of, and often larger than, the direct impact of reduced income
on well-being.  Where job losses are widespread in particular communities, whole
17 While further analysis is required, more differentiated levels of tuition subsidy may also promote concentrations of excellence.
18 New Zealand’s ratio of per student expenditure in tertiary education compared to primary (or secondary) is still comparatively high
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communities can also be disrupted19.  For most prime-age adults, having a satisfying
job is directly important to well-being (e.g. people who get jobs report significantly
improved satisfaction with their lives (Jenkins, 2001)), though as jobs become more
demanding, the impact on parenting, family life and work-related stress cannot be
ignored.
From a national rather than an individual focus, increased paid employment (through
reducing unemployment and raising participation) yields a long list of benefits:
• It is a key means of raising national economic output and thereby well-being via
higher income per head (although there is some offset from the loss of home
production, including possibly the care of children and other dependent people).
• Work experience helps improve human capital – and so the earnings potential – of
the working-age population.
• Since many non-workers are poor, it contributes to reducing income inequality, and
taking people out of poverty20.
• It is positive for fiscal outcomes on both the tax and expenditure sides of the budget
(generating or releasing funds for higher priority expenditure, debt reduction or tax
cuts).
• It can contribute to social cohesion as the number of people on benefits paid for by
others reduces.
• Participation in work widens social networks which is an important asset for
economic development and social capability in the longer term.
• As the population ages, it will become increasingly important to raise participation
rates among people of working age and those past current retirement age in order
to maintain fiscal health and economic growth.
Unpaid work has many but not all of these benefits.  Job quality of course varies a lot
and can affect the extent of benefits accordingly.  But even low-wage, low-skill jobs
are usually better for individuals in a position to take paid work, and for society, than
no jobs.
Good policy can deliver higher employment
One of the keys to high employment is steady and predictable economic growth.
Recessions are not bad simply because they reduce the number of jobs at the time the
recession is happening.  They also create a damaging longer-term increase in the
minimum level of unemployment that is sustainable without creating rising inflation21.
This happens because many of those thrown out of work in a bad recession tend to lose
their attachment to the labour market – a result of loss of skills, work habits and
19 This occurred in New Zealand during the period after 1984, for example.
20 Jenkins (2001) finds the probability of poor people who get full-time work exiting poverty to be of the order of 70% to 80%.
21 Economists often refer to this “equilibrium” level of unemployment as the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment, or NAIRU.Towards an Inclusive Economy      39
motivation.  As the economy recovers from recession, these discouraged workers do
not flow back to fill the new jobs and this limits how much unemployment can be
reduced before the tightness of the labour market starts to cause rapidly accelerating
inflation.  Hence there is likely to be a prolonged adjustment period in which trying to
reduce unemployment to its original level too fast will be unsustainable.
In addition to stable macro-economic policy, other policies are important.  Policies to
promote competition between firms in the supply of products and between workers
(particularly skilled workers) in the supply of their labour reduce their ability to
demand price increases and wage increases respectively.  They thereby allow the
Reserve Bank to be more relaxed about running the economy closer to full capacity
and at a lower level of unemployment.
Policies targeted specifically at the long-term unemployed (and people without jobs in
regions of high unemployment) can also reduce the minimum sustainable level of
unemployment.  This follows from the fact that these unemployed people do not
provide effective downward wage pressure via search activity or by providing a
credible source of labour supply in the eyes of employers.  Therefore getting more of
them into jobs does not raise inflation risks.  In addition, improving the employment
opportunities and job experience of these groups is particularly important for
reducing poverty and a range of longer-term risks to well-being.
New Zealand compares favourably with average OECD performance on standardised
unemployment and participation rates.  But as Table 3.1 indicates, evidence from
countries such as the US, the UK and Denmark suggests that it is possible to achieve
lower unemployment and higher participation than we have currently in New Zealand.
Table 3.1 Unemployment and labour market participation rates
NZ US UK Denmark
Unemployment rate
(ratio of unemployed to workforce, ILO definition, 2000) 6.0% 4.0% 5.5% 4.8%
Participation rate
(ratio of workforce to working-age population, 15-64 years, 1999) 75.2% 77.2% 76.3% 80.6%
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, June 2000 and OECD Labour Force Statistics, 1979-99, part III.
The experience of these countries is that a generalised lack of jobs (insufficient labour
demand) is not a problem in most settings though there may be instances of regional
or skill imbalance (sections 3.2 and 3.4, on Human capital and Geography, deal with
these issues).  In New Zealand the policies of the Reserve Bank ensure enough overall
demand to create as many jobs as possible consistent with achieving an inflation rate
within the target band.  The mechanism is that, if unemployment rises and inflation
falls too much, the Reserve Bank will reduce interest rates to increase aggregate
demand to the point that inflation will move back into its target band.40      Towards an Inclusive Economy
The benefits of low unemployment for well-being are illustrated by the United States’
economic boom of the 1990s and early 2000s.  Freeman (2001) showed that the long
period of economic growth significantly improved the well-being of people on the lower
rungs of the income distribution via lower unemployment and higher earnings.  The
tight labour market in the United States reduced poverty substantively.  But this
occurred at an unemployment rate of 4% to 5%, not at 6% to 6.5%, the rate once
viewed as the sustainable equilibrium for the United States.   Freeman also found a
reduction in socially undesirable behaviours such as crime and teenage motherhood
associated with the rise in employment and reduction in poverty.
Alongside macro-economic stability and growth, cross-country evidence indicates that
several types of micro-level policy settings are important in generating better labour
market outcomes (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Nickell and Layard, 1998).  We can
label these as wage-setting arrangements, tax-benefit policies (“making work pay”),
benefit administration and “active” labour market policies (including relocation
assistance).  Programmes involving combinations of the last three of these are
sometimes referred to as “welfare-to-work” strategies.
Wage-setting arrangements affect the minimum sustainable unemployment rate
Evidence suggests that the wage-setting structures that work best to minimise
unemployment are either centralised, highly co-ordinated bargaining between labour
unions and employers, or decentralised, independent work-place bargains (Blanchard
and Wolfers, 2000; Nickell and Layard, 1998).  Historically New Zealand has shifted
from an approach largely based on the former (seen in the operation of the
Arbitration Court and national wage awards up to the 1960s) to a position close to the
latter in the 1990s.  Systems that sit in the middle between centralised and
decentralised bargaining perform poorly.  They raise the sustainable equilibrium rate
of unemployment by several percentage points by encouraging unco-ordinated wage
leapfrogging by “insiders” with jobs at the expense of unemployed “outsiders”.  New
Zealand’s recent shift from the Employment Contracts Act to the Employment
Relations Act appears, at least so far, not to have disturbed significantly the system’s
basically decentralised character.
Wage-setting arrangements are a form of labour market regulation. Other labour
market regulations such as minimum codes and wages, paid parental leave and
employment protection laws generally aim to increase the quality rather than the
quantity of jobs.  But they can quite easily have the undesirable side effect of raising
unemployment.  Their design therefore needs to strike the right balance between
protecting workers against exploitation and getting vulnerable unemployed people
(whether due to lack of education, low skills or discrimination) into jobs.  Sen (1999) is
particularly critical of the high-wage/high-unemployment path taken by some
European countries, because of its adverse impact on people’s well-being through
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“Making work pay” may encourage people into jobs
There is a long tradition both in New Zealand and overseas of using reforms to the
tax-benefit system to try to alleviate both the “unemployment trap” and the “poverty
trap”.  These traps relate, respectively, to the lack of incentive to take a job over
remaining on benefit, and the disincentive to work extra hours in the face of high
effective marginal rates of tax caused largely by the withdrawal of benefits as
incomes rise.  Reducing either trap improves the monetary rewards of working
relative to not working.  Hence reforms that do this are sometimes referred to as
“making work pay”.
A key problem with “making-work-pay” reforms is that it is impossible to improve one
of the traps without worsening the other, except by reducing benefit levels relative to
wages. The alternative of raising the after-tax wages of the unskilled relative to
benefits is fiscally expensive and moves the incentive problem further up the income
scale in the form of higher marginal tax rates.  Current New Zealand policy settings
appear to offer a reasonable compromise and this is supported by recent steady falls
in the number of those receiving unemployment benefit.
There is overseas evidence that wage subsidy schemes may offer benefits, particularly
in the long run, in the case of considerably disadvantaged potential workers.  The
schemes involve paying wage subsidies to employers who hire particular types of
workers (e.g. those who have been out of work for an extended period and/or who have
few skills).  Some schemes of this type exist in New Zealand.  But these schemes are
costly and can displace existing workers as well as causing job “churning” as
successive groups of disadvantaged workers replace one another, when the time limit
on subsidies runs out.  Nevertheless, there may still be a net gain if the newly
employed displaces an existing employee who is less likely to drift into long-term
exclusion from the labour market.
“Making-work-pay” schemes in which the government makes direct payments to
disadvantaged groups may be a more efficient way of encouraging labour market
participation in situations where low wages are regarded as a major barrier to taking
a job.  An intensively studied example of such a scheme is the Canadian “Self-
Sufficiency Project” aimed at getting sole parents into full-time work (see Box 3.4).
The findings from its interim evaluation suggest that a generous payment to sole-
parent welfare recipients who obtain full-time work can bring multiple benefits –
increased employment and higher incomes for low-income people, with little or no net
increase in the cost of government transfers (Greenwood and Voyer, 1999;
Michalopoulos, Card, Gennetian, Harknett and Robins, 2000).  The approach might be
even more effective if combined with other policies to overcome barriers to work such
as child care and transport problems22.
22 The interim results look very promising.  However, there are some grounds for caution: the project appears to have high “deadweight”
costs (payments going to people who would have worked anyway); we have yet to see what happens when the three-year period of assistance
comes to an end; and there is the usual proviso about transferability of an overseas project into the New Zealand context.  Nevertheless, the
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Box 3.4:  Key interim findings from the Canadian “Self-Sufficiency Project”
• The programme – a randomised trial of a substantial financial incentive to work (payment of half the
difference between actual earnings and an earnings “reference level”, usually double the earnings
from a minimum wage job or from social welfare).  Targeted at single-parent, longer-term (over 12
months) recipients of welfare.  Payments for taking a job available for 12 months after enrolment and
paid for three years as long as participants continue to work full-time.  Full-time work required.
Relatively low tax rate for those who earn more while receiving the wage supplement.
• The effects – 35.2% of 9,000 enrolled in two provinces left welfare for full-time work in the 12-month
eligibility period, but two-thirds did not, mainly on the grounds that they could not find a full-time job
or could not overcome other barriers to work.
• Providing an additional, modest package of employment-related support increased the likelihood of
take-up from one in three to one in two.
• At its peak, 29% of programme members were working full-time versus 14% of the control group.
• The work-conditioned financial incentive not only increased stable work among the target population,
it also significantly raised incomes and reduced receipt of social assistance compared with controls,
thereby reducing the net cost to government to a very low level.  Poverty also reduced significantly.
• Although most of the jobs that people got paid close to the minimum wage, wages grew over time for
those who worked full-time.
• There appeared to be no adverse effects on young children, possible positive benefits for school-age
children and possible negative behavioural effects on adolescent children of participants (Morris and
Michalopoulos, 2000).
More rigorous benefit administration is important
Becoming unemployed often de-motivates people and damages their self-esteem.
Creating an expectation that those in a position to work should seek it can help people
overcome these barriers and facilitate their return to work.  In addition, creating such
an expectation meets the reasonable expectation of taxpayers that those who can
work should do so.  This helps to maintain the legitimacy of the benefit system23.  For
both reasons, the administration of the benefit system should support and be part of
an overall “welfare-to-work” strategy24.
23 A survey conducted for the New Zealand Royal Commission on Social Policy (1988) found there was a strong sense of community
responsibility for the less well off, but also a strong belief in the importance of individual responsibility.
24 OECD (2000d) surveys the variety of approaches across countries and draws some conclusions.Towards an Inclusive Economy      43
Unemployment beneficiaries are rightly required to attend regular interviews and
prepare return-to-work plans with the help of job counsellors.  Areas where
improvements could still be made are more detailed job-search requirements, more
active monitoring by Department of Work and Income (DWI) staff, and greater
preparedness to use available sanctions.  OECD work suggests that the New Zealand
work test is administered in a relatively gentle way compared to other countries and
that a tougher approach is effective (OECD, 2000d).  Beneficiaries should be required
to take jobs on offer even if they are not ideal in terms of job type or location, subject
to criteria that the taxpayers funding the benefits would regard as reasonable.
Having a single agency responsible for job placement, benefit payments and “active”
labour market policies (e.g. training) as in New Zealand has the potential to offer
considerable advantages in overcoming the “unemployment trap” and in ensuring
that those receiving benefits and engaged on “active” programmes continue to follow
the agreed steps to raise their employability and secure a job.  Nonetheless, there
could be value in reviewing the DWI’s case management systems to evaluate whether
the balance between getting people into jobs and meeting their income and training
needs should be moved more in favour of the former.  Training could then continue
during employment with the aim to increase the duration of job tenure and foster
career progression.
“Active” labour market policies can also help, but are tricky to get right
“Active” labour market policies are measures that attempt to integrate unemployed
or economically disadvantaged potential workers into the workforce by helping them
with searching for a job, improving their skills or developing work-related habits such
as punctuality.  They can be contrasted with “passive” policies that focus on meeting
the financial needs of those not in work until such time as they can find work
unassisted.  The evidence on the effectiveness of “active” labour market policies
suggests that most approaches struggle to help the most disadvantaged (e.g. older
unskilled workers) get into satisfactory work but that carefully targeted and relatively
intensive (and costly) interventions can be effective.
A variant of “active” labour market policy is the so-called “work first” approach that
promotes immediate job entry (usually buttressed by some initial training) rather than
more expensive human capital-oriented programmes.  Work-first programmes may
also offer training whilst in work.  (In contrast, human capital-oriented programmes
focus on improving beneficiaries’ education and skills before encouraging them to
seek work.)
The Riverside County, California GAIN (“Greater Avenues to Independence”)
programme is a successful example of the “work first” approach.  Over the first three
years of evaluation the “work first” approach in Riverside was superior to the human
capital approach followed in two matched programmes in other counties in terms of
employment, earnings and reduction in welfare spending.  The Riverside programme
cost was also significantly lower (Hotz, Imbens and Klerman, 2000)25.
25 However, seven to nine years after commencement, the human capital approach turned in better results than the Riverside approach
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The difficulty in assessing what works and what does not suggests that the approach
of basing funding on achieved outcomes, currently being developed for piloting by
New Zealand officials, holds considerable promise.  Under it, the Government would
pay by results.  This would give participating non-governmental organisations the
incentive to match their interventions to the particular needs of the unemployed.
Preliminary evidence from Australia suggests such schemes can be quite effective
(DEWRSB, 2000).
In regions with low demand for labour, it may be necessary to consider schemes to
help those who wish to relocate to move to places where the likelihood of finding work
is greater (see Geography section below).  By shifting workers from areas of high
unemployment to low unemployment, such schemes may reduce inflationary pressures
caused by tight labour markets and lower the equilibrium rate of unemployment.
They could comprise one or more forms of assistance including housing assistance, or
a subsidy to employer or employee.  Currently, no substantial schemes explicitly
designed to support such moves exist in New Zealand.
In our discussion of micro-level policies, the main focus has been on getting the
unemployed into jobs.  But most of the approaches also have the potential to raise
participation rates: “making work pay” would persuade some previously inactive
people to enter the labour market; “active” labour market policies can be tailored to
groups with high levels of inactivity such as older unskilled men, or the disabled; and
tighter benefit administration with a selective “work first” focus could apply to other
types of beneficiary in addition to the unemployed.  This is an area for further work.
Summary
Because low-income, low-skilled individuals suffer high rates of unemployment and
non-participation, and getting a job can increase well-being across a number of
dimensions, policies to reduce unemployment and non-participation should be a
priority.  While education holds the key to improving skills on the lower rungs of the
distribution, it will take time.  Getting current cohorts of low-income, low-skilled
adults into jobs is the next-best approach.  Micro-policies should aim to enhance
competition in both the product and the labour markets.  They should also assist and
encourage people into work, particularly the long-term unemployed.  This will lower
the equilibrium rate of unemployment and enable the Reserve Bank to allow increased
demand and reduced unemployment without creating inflation.  The evidence is that
this benefits those on the lowest incomes (Dollar and Kraay, 2001; Freeman, 2001).
The design of specific labour market policies to achieve this is tricky, but there is
evidence that supports the effectiveness of certain schemes.  These include some
“make work pay” schemes, some “active” labour market policies and a tighter
approach to benefit administration including increased emphasis on the “work first”
approach.  Policy development also needs to focus on barriers facing particular
groups such as the disabled and single parents (e.g. the child care costs of work)26,
and the impact of more work on the time available for effective parenting and family
life.
26 The evidence is mixed on whether it is good or bad for young children to be placed in child care so their parent(s) can work.  As pointed
out in the Human capital section, early childhood is a critical period for development.Towards an Inclusive Economy      45
While the focus of this section has been largely on getting those on unemployment
benefit into work, most of the policies would also raise participation rates – “making
work pay” would persuade some previously inactive people to enter the labour market,
“active” labour market policies could be tailored to groups with high levels of
inactivity such as older unskilled men, and tighter benefit administration with a
selective “work first” focus could be applied to beneficiary types other than the
unemployed.
3.4 Geography
Both within New Zealand and internationally, people and activity are increasingly
drawn to dense urban areas.  In general, agglomeration of activity within New
Zealand – such as in cities – is good for economic growth.  However, it also brings
risks.  The government may be concerned about low well-being neighbourhoods and
regions in themselves, as opposed to low well-being individuals and families, if
negative spillovers lead to cycles of deprivation, or if people become stuck in declining
areas.
From an international perspective, although integration with the rest of the world is
good for New Zealand’s productivity, globalisation and the international mobility of
skilled labour have implications for domestic policy, particularly in the areas of
income distribution and social capability.
Concentration of economic activity helps economic growth, but can cause problems
Many of the differences in geographical concentration of people and well-being result
from choices made by people and firms in response to varying personal and regional
characteristics, and so constitute the best outcomes that people can achieve for
themselves.  Other differences represent points in a process of regional adjustment.
Adjustment is a natural and necessary process; it is what happened when people
moved from former West Coast gold-rush towns to areas with greater opportunities,
for example.
Some regional differences are good for New Zealand.  Cities provide benefits to both
producers and consumers, and are important for New Zealand’s economic
performance.  United States evidence has shown that if the population density of an
area doubles, labour productivity increases by 6% and total factor productivity by 4%
(Ciccone and Hall, 1996).  Furthermore, there is a wage premium of over 20% in
United States cities and there is evidence that this is related to higher human capital
accumulation (Glaeser and Mare, 2001).  Recent New Zealand evidence (Kerr and
Timmins, 2000) suggests that internal migration patterns reflect a similar mechanism
operating here.
This evidence suggests that increasing agglomeration has positive benefits up to a city
size well in excess of Auckland’s.  Increasing agglomeration could also be important
for our smaller cities – if for example there are industry-specific factors associated
with New Zealand’s relatively high reliance on primary production.  We conclude that
the larger cities, and Auckland in particular, are likely to be a critical force in New
Zealand’s long-term economic development27.
27 Such things as the business cycle, changes in relative prices etc can mean that cities do not grow more rapidly than other parts of the
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Regional differences, however, are of particular concern in two cases: when there are
negative “neighbourhood effects”, and when there are high costs of adjustment.
Similar sorts of people tend to choose to live in similar sorts of places because, for
example, they can afford similar housing, need similar social services, identify
personally or culturally with others in the area, or can provide each other with
community support.  However, when groups of low well-being people live together,
there may be negative spillovers or “neighbourhood effects” that perpetuate social
problems and result in even poorer outcomes for these groups.  There are likely to be
fewer educational opportunities, poorer quality of education, poor local infrastructure,
difficulty in establishing businesses, and lack of access to information-rich networks.
It is these sorts of interactions that may lead to cycles of disadvantage, urban ghettos
and dysfunction in remote communities.
Despite the intuitive appeal of “neighbourhood effects”, research has found it very
difficult to document empirically, in large part because of the difficulty of working out
whether disadvantaged communities arise because disadvantaged people choose to
live together, or because living together also worsens their prospects.  While this
makes it difficult to prove that spillovers exist, their possible existence suggests policy
for the disadvantaged should focus at least partly on deprived neighbourhoods.  Even
in the absence of “neighbourhood effects”, the existence of deprived communities may
allow the government to use communities as a marker for targeting individuals and
families, for example in the delivery of health services.  The preponderance of Mäori
and Pacific Island people in these communities and neighbourhoods constitutes a key
dimension for policy attention.
The second reason government may be concerned about regional differences is when
people who are unable to find work locally do not relocate to areas where there are
jobs because the costs of adjustment are so high.  Differences in house prices or rents
between regions, for example, may mean people become stuck in declining rural
regions28.  There are, of course, some who are not stuck, but choose to remain in
deprived regions for non-economic reasons.  These people face a difficult trade-off
between the well-being gained from moving (the benefits of income and a job) and the
well-being gained from staying (existing social ties and connections to place).
As Box 3.5 below illustrates, when we look at deprivation in New Zealand29 we see
that Auckland contains by far the largest number of people in deprived
neighbourhoods (36.5%), followed by the Waikato (Treasury, 2001b).  Furthermore,
the proportion of Auckland’s population living in deprived neighbourhoods has also
increased between 1986 and 1996.  We have discussed the importance of cities for
economic performance.  Given the concentration of deprived neighbourhoods in South
Auckland, negative spillovers are likely to be a particular problem here.  Anecdotal
evidence also suggests that, despite geographical proximity, deprived Aucklanders
are not very well connected to the rest of the metropolitan region.  For all these
reasons, Auckland is a crucial focus.
28 A related factor may be some people’s reluctance to crystallise capital losses by selling assets that have declined in value.
29 This work on deprivation looked at the location of the 10% of the population living in the most deprived meshblocks (neighbourhoods of
about 100 people) based on an index of income, employment and education.Towards an Inclusive Economy      47
Box 3.5: Location of the 10% of New Zealand’s population who live in the most deprived
meshblocks in 1996

































































































































































































































































































































Relative to heavily populated areas such as Auckland, rural regions are less of a
policy concern because they have far fewer deprived neighbourhoods.  Nevertheless,
they warrant attention if many people have no local options and face real barriers to
relocation.  As job opportunities reduce in non-urban areas, and those who can
relocate do so, the risks of negative “neighbourhood effects” in the communities that
remain increase.  When community functioning is impaired the region concerned
suffers and, in serious cases, there may be spillovers affecting the social cohesion of
New Zealand as a whole.  As Box 3.5 shows, Gisborne and Northland have the highest
proportion of their populations living in deprived neighbourhoods (around 24%).
Whilst Gisborne has been persistently deprived, it is in fact improving, whereas
Northland has declined significantly.  In 1986 only 10% of Northlanders lived in the
most deprived neighbourhoods – by 1996 that figure had risen to almost 24%.
Furthermore, the association between ethnicity and deprivation whether in urban
centres or regional areas, suggests a focus for policy analysis.
Government can affect deprived areas through its policies in three ways.  It can
inadvertently affect them by national policies that are non-spatial, but have spatial
impacts.  It can affect people through policies directly aimed at particular locations.
It can affect people through policies aimed to help people in particular locations.
National policies can have unintended regional effects
Non-spatial policies, including minimum wages, benefit levels, industry policy and
infrastructure policy, may have a spatial impact.  There is a danger that policies that
seem fair at a national level may have dysfunctional effects when considered
regionally.  For example, since the unemployment benefit is fixed nationally, it may48      Towards an Inclusive Economy
encourage people to live where the cost of living is low rather than where the jobs are.
This may not be in their long-term best interests.  Further work needs to be
undertaken in this area to ascertain what the policy implications might be.
Governments should be cautious about policies aimed at particular locations
Central government may be able to contribute to regional development by assisting
local interests to work together.  Better co-ordination, facilitation and provision of
information are sensible, low-cost ways of helping regions to identify their potential
areas of economic development and do something positive to develop them.  Local
government, local business, and community and Mäori interests can all play an
important co-operative role in improving a region’s capability.  Some of the recent
initiatives outlined in Box 3.6 such as the ‘Heartland Services Initiative’ offer ways to
focus local efforts, potentially adding to both growth and well-being.  Promoting social
and informational networks may contribute to building social capability and
enhancing productive capacity.  Worthwhile areas for investigation include supporting
the role of “social entrepreneurs” in selected communities, access to the internet and
telephone services, and the interface between people and government services, both
local and central.
However, the Government should be cautious in promoting regional or place-based
policies.  While some such policies – like those mentioned above – can be worthwhile,
place-based policies are often less effective than helping disadvantaged people to
adjust.  Large-scale expenditure by central government to selected recipient regions is
likely to involve significant costs to contributing regions and the benefits to the wider
economy are unlikely to outweigh their costs.  Place-based policies therefore need to
be selective.  As the next section makes clear, cities are likely to be an important
source of growth for New Zealand.  These cities compete with other urban
agglomerations, notably Sydney, in providing residence for workers and firms.  One of
the costs of assisting struggling non-urban regions may be that it promotes overseas
cities at New Zealand’s expense.Towards an Inclusive Economy      49
Box 3.6: Policy initiatives in rural deprived regions
In 2000 the Government identified Northland, Eastern Bay of Plenty and South Waikato as priorities for
regional development assistance.
In May 2000 the Tairawhiti (East Cape) Taskforce was launched “to provide leadership and direction”
to support the Tairawhiti community by:
• Creating a partnership between central and local government, local runanga and industry.
• Putting in place a development strategy, creating sustainable jobs and “delivering a better
life”.
In November 2000 the Government announced:
• 2000 surplus computers to be placed in local schools with appropriate software and training.
• A joint venture with Telecom to create 13 computer hubs in local facilities to enable access to
the internet.
• Placement of Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry advisor on use of Mäori land in Tairawhiti.
• Commitment to process 60% of logs in the region.
• Review of the road, port and rail infrastructure of the East Cape region.
In December 2000 the “Heartland Services Initiative” was launched.  Key government departments
developed an “outreach” programme to:
• Establish joint service centres in some provincial towns.
• Collaborate and synchronise their business in isolated communities and to make regular visits
at least monthly.
In March 2001 the Government approved a national operational framework for government’s engagement
with regions with acute needs.  It identified forestry, infrastructure, land use, and building strong
regional partnerships as priority issues.
In June 2001 the Department of Labour prepared a report on the employment, skills and training needs
for the wood processing industries, with particular reference to the Tairawhiti region.
In April 2001 the Government endorsed a national wood-processing strategy to co-ordinate forest industry
development issues in new forestry growth regions including Tairawhiti/Hawkes Bay, Northland, and
the southern North Island.
The strategy includes:
• The establishment of a steering group with central and local government,  industry, community
and Mäori representation.
• Working groups to address biosecurity; research, science and technology; trade access; trade
enhancement; certification; investment; climate change.
Goals include:
• Developing a transport network in new forest regions.
• A 20% increase in industry-related employment by 2005.
• Attracting at least $3 billion investment by 2010.
• Processing at least half of new logs in New Zealand by 2015.50      Towards an Inclusive Economy
People-based policies are more promising
In terms of policies that target deprived areas, policies that help deprived people
within regions seem more promising.  In particular, there is a potential role for
government in helping people in declining regions to overcome costly barriers to
taking up new jobs in other parts of the country.  Policy should focus on initiatives
such as job-search assistance, and relocation assistance for those who would like to
move but face barriers to doing so.  These policies would have a double benefit of
helping people in deprived regions get jobs, and helping employers in growing regions
fill vacancies.  The downside is that outcomes may be even worse for those left behind.
Of the other options, focusing on education seems promising.  Firstly, it has the direct
effect of raising earnings prospects for those in the area.  Secondly, improving the
quality of schooling is probably the best way to address “neighbourhood effects” –
better local schools promote positive spillovers, attract to or retain in the area higher
well-being families, and improve social capability. By providing people in isolated
deprived regions with skills, education can also facilitate people moving to jobs in
high-growth areas.  In both deprived city neighbourhoods and deprived isolated areas,
investment in the quality of governance and leadership of local schools, and
particularly the school-parent partnership, is likely to be important30.
Building connections (“bridging” social capital) between deprived areas and wider
New Zealand society may also help address neighbourhood effects, by exposing
deprived individuals to more positive interactions and encouraging beneficial
spillovers.
Finally, the best mix of policy levers to achieve spatial policy goals will only become
clear as a result of careful evaluation of current policies.  Such evaluation ought to be
a key component of any people- or place-based interventions.
Globalisation helps growth but also presents challenges for New Zealand
Economic integration with other countries, in goods, services, capital and labour, has
important benefits for New Zealand.  It improves productivity through allowing us to
allocate our resources better and specialise in what we do best.  Flows of ideas and
people from overseas help New Zealanders become more skilled, educated and
innovative, and help New Zealand businesses learn about and adopt cutting-edge
technology and management practices.  The message for policy is: just as
connectedness is vital for regions within New Zealand, our connectedness with the rest
of the world is crucial in maintaining high standards of living.
Globalisation also presents challenges for New Zealand.  Inward flows of people
enrich New Zealand socially and economically by bringing new skills and
perspectives, making us more cosmopolitan and, we hope, more open-minded and
tolerant.  However in the short term immigration may also have costs, both
30 For example, Box 3.3 in the Human capital section describes the SEMO initiative to foster parent-school-community partnerships that
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economically (immigrants earn less initially, and often struggle to have their
qualifications recognised) and socially (as current New Zealanders adjust to new
citizens and the change they bring to national identity).
A more serious future issue may be emigration.  To date New Zealand has
experienced a “brain exchange” rather than a “brain drain”, the skills of emigrants
largely being replaced by skilled immigrants.  Since the forces of agglomeration
operate across national borders as well as within them, and New Zealand is small and
remote in world terms, we face the risk that other locations will become more
desirable, both to New Zealanders and would-be immigrants.  In particular, the
departure of young, highly educated New Zealanders would be a fiscal loss because of
the cost of their expensive education and foregone taxes (exacerbated in some cases
by unpaid student loans); an economic loss of potential innovators, technicians,
managers and leaders; and an obvious social loss.
We are starting to see increasing international competition for skilled labour.  The
United States and the United Kingdom, for example, have recently relaxed their
immigration rules for IT specialists and other skills in short supply.  In the future
some European countries may open their doors in an effort to combat low birth rates
and offset the fiscal strain of their ageing populations.  In addition, we will probably
continue to lose people of all skill levels to Australia.
To the extent that this scenario occurs, there are several implications for policy:
•The Government needs to strive to make New Zealand an attractive location to
which people wish to remain connected.  Economic conditions and prospects are a
key determinant of flows particularly between New Zealand and Australia.
•The Government also needs to recognise other factors that pull people and
companies overseas, such as more challenging opportunities, and do what it can to
match these things at home.  It has an important role in making New Zealand a
clean, “green”, safe, vibrant, dynamic place in which New Zealanders want to live,
work and educate their children.
•After-tax wages for skilled labour and the cost of capital are likely to be
increasingly linked to world rates.  Income taxes imposed on skilled labour and
capital will in fact be borne by landowners and less skilled labour, through lower
land prices and lower real wages.  Therefore the only realistic way to reduce income
dispersion in a sustainable way will be to increase per capita income growth by
improving the education and skills of those on the lower rungs of the income
distribution.
•The ability of government to raise taxes from individuals and companies is likely to
depend increasingly on its ability to deliver value to those same individuals and
companies.  In particular, income redistribution that does not have widespread
support from those paying the taxes may become increasingly difficult and
increasingly lead to migration of those subject to what they see as unjustified
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•The availability of an exit option for an important group in the population may
reduce their incentive to engage in normal political processes, leading to greater
social fragmentation.
•In an environment of global competition for immigrants, settlement policy is crucial.
English-language training and occupational regulation that balances the risk of
inadequate skills with the risk of under-utilised qualifications and compliance costs
are particularly important areas.
•In a global, integrated world of people flowing more freely between countries, the
idea of being a New Zealander will become less linked to residence in New Zealand.
The worldwide community of New Zealanders should be viewed as an opportunity as
well as a threat.  Policy could explore ways to enhance connections with offshore
New Zealanders and exploit the diaspora.
Summary
Both within New Zealand and internationally, there are major economic forces driving
location of people and activity.  The Government is largely in the position of
responding to the effects of these location choices.  It can ease adjustment and
change, but it cannot stop it.
A key lesson from the consideration of New Zealand’s economic geography is the
importance of concentration of economic activity – particularly cities like Auckland –
to New Zealand’s future prospects.  It is these locations that will provide the best
chance of providing satisfying jobs and rewarding lives to skilled New Zealanders, so
encouraging them to live here rather than overseas.  Policy should facilitate people in
adjusting to take advantage of these benefits, while managing the risks associated
with concentration.  However, it is also important that government consider
appropriate policies towards those that remain in regional communities.
3.5 Institutions and values
Public institutions31 provide the broad framework within which politics, society and
the economy function.  They have major impacts on the well-being of New Zealanders,
both directly through opportunities for democratic participation and the protection of
important individual freedoms, and indirectly through their impact on the functioning
of society and the economy.
The governance of public institutions, defined broadly as the formal and informal
ways in which power and authority are exercised in these institutions, affects their
performance – and so their contribution to well-being.
The quality of governance of public institutions affects well-being first through their
success in protecting the intrinsically important individual freedoms that Sen (1999)
articulates, as outlined above in section 2.
31 Public institutions include, for example, Parliament, government departments, Crown agencies, local government and the activities of
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A second tier of benefits from good governance arises from their instrumental value in
promoting social capability and economic performance.  Annex B.3 details the
channels, mechanisms and the evidence for a variety of both the intrinsic (direct) and
instrumental (indirect) effects of good governance on well-being.
Shared or mutually respected values – such as trust and respect for the law – can also
impact positively on both social and economic relations, lowering barriers to all forms
of social and economic interactions.
New Zealand faces risks that good governance can reduce
New Zealand generally scores well in international surveys of its governance (World
Economic Forum, 1999; Transparency International, 2000).
However, certain features of our economy – such as a large and chronic current
account deficit and one of the highest external debt to GDP ratios among OECD
countries – make us vulnerable to international sentiment about the quality of the
business environment, including the quality and integrity of public sector governance.
Good governance is also important for New Zealand because of the particular
challenge of establishing a more solid basis for inter-group and inter-ethnic co-
operation and cohesion in New Zealand.
More generally, the increasing complexity facing policy-makers from the need to form
judgements about the causes of outcomes that cut across sectors and are long-term in
nature poses a challenge to public sector governance.
Some specific risks to the quality of governance in New Zealand include:
•The potential for incidents of corruption and mal-administration in government
agencies, which, if they occur, are likely to reduce public confidence in the state
sector.
•Excessive unjustified criticism of the probity of the state sector, which could
undermine public confidence in the state sector.
•The scope for and inevitability of conflicts of interest, given our small size.
•The increasing international exposure of our society and economy, including the
higher levels of interaction of New Zealanders with people from countries in which
corruption is the norm or at least widely tolerated.
Other factors in New Zealand reinforce the need to strengthen opportunities for
democratic participation and assure institutional integrity.  Public surveys of New
Zealanders’ values and attitudes reveal a lack of trust in public institutions such as
Parliament (and Mixed Member Proportional Representation (MMP) in particular),
and a concern that the country is run for the benefit of narrow interests rather than
the public interest (New Zealand Study of Values, 1985; 1989; 1998 – see Perry and
Webster, 1999).  The surveys also indicate wide individual and group differences of
view on important issues such as the Treaty of Waitangi and the nature and extent of
a taxpayer-funded social safety net.54      Towards an Inclusive Economy
Broader consensus on what works would help policy stability
A number of commentators have expressed concern over recent years about policy
shifts being driven by one side or the other of the political spectrum rather than
broader consensus, e.g. on health policy or retirement income policy.  It would
therefore be desirable to find ways of adopting a broader consensus on policy to either
inhibit abrupt changes when they are not justified by circumstances, or promote early,
smaller changes when they are.  For example, it is arguable that the 1980s reforms
could have been less radical and disruptive if there had been earlier adjustments to
the changes in New Zealand’s economic circumstances in the 1970s.
One way to foster broader consensus would be for politicians to lead reasoned public
debate about ends and means.  Another is to improve our knowledge of what works
best to achieve given objectives.  This is likely to follow from more and better
evaluation and greater scrutiny of government programmes, together with greater
accountability for them.
Accountability should focus on the results of government activities
Accountability for the results achieved by government action is fundamental to good
governance.  The Public Finance and Fiscal Responsibility Acts have delivered some
real gains in New Zealand, particularly in terms of greater transparency.  But
accountability for the outcomes of government activities is widely acknowledged to
have proved a weak part of our public management system (Petrie and Webber,
2001).  Among the initiatives that could be considered are:
•Obtaining better information on outcomes by sector or major portfolio area, and
comprehensive reporting of these at a whole-of-government level.  The importance of
comprehensive outcome reporting, together with better research and evaluation, is
being increasingly recognised as a means of achieving more integrated and
coherent policies32.
•Generating a greater focus on results at the individual departmental level by driving
strategic plans off an outcome focus, and measuring value for money more in
outcome terms.
•Adding to tax information already furnished in the Budget Policy Statement by
requiring governments to publish their desired tax policy outcomes, progress in
achieving them, and regular statements of tax expenditures.
•Increasing the use of independent policy analysis in technical areas such as business
taxation.
Together, these measures would facilitate improved scrutiny of the results of
government actions.
Further discussion of these proposals is included in Annex C.
32 For instance, the OECD’s current work on sustainable development suggests this (OECD 2001c).Towards an Inclusive Economy      55
There is a case for strengthening ethical safeguards in public institutions…
Parliament is the supreme authority in New Zealand.  Social cohesion ultimately rests
on faith in the integrity of Parliament.  In Parliament, as in law, justice must be seen
to be done.
The introduction of MMP may lead to an increase in lobbying of Members of
Parliament.  A change that might be considered, therefore, is the introduction of a
code of conduct for Parliamentarians, covering issues such as conflicts of interest,
public disclosure of private interests, and acceptance of gifts and hospitality, similar
to that which exists now for Cabinet Ministers33.  A similar gap exists at the local
government level.
Incidents in recent years have heightened awareness of risks to public confidence in
the integrity of the Public Service.  One response would be for government to consider
commissioning a survey of public servant understanding of, and attitudes towards,
standards and integrity.  International experience suggests that surveys of public
officials can be an effective means of identifying areas of vulnerability in public
institutions (Kaufmann et al, 2000).  This may help focus any remedial efforts on
priority areas, and it could establish a benchmark for subsequent monitoring.
…and improving the transparency of public appointments
Given the size of the assets and funding under the control of statutory bodies in New
Zealand, and so the importance of having technically competent as well as
representative boards, the Government should strengthen the procedures requiring
appointment on merit, and buttress them with legislation.  For example, the Cabinet
Office appointment procedures could be codified in law.  This would increase their
visibility and status.  Desirably, the change would also establish the responsibility of
an independent party to audit and report to Parliament on compliance with the
procedures.
Strengthening Mäori institutions and governance should yield gains
There are important potential gains in Mäori social and economic capability to be
made from a careful linking of areas of government activity.  These are facilitating
the Treaty of Waitangi process; the strengthening of Mäori governance; more general
capacity building in Mäori society; and decentralisation of government service
delivery.
The Treaty of Waitangi process
For reasons of both good governance and social cohesion, the resolution of historical
Treaty claims is an area of critical strategic importance to any New Zealand
Government34.  The settlement process provides an opportunity to heal grievances and
build Mäori capability – but also risks exacerbating existing tensions or creating new
social divisions.  The claims process remains an inherently complex, contested and
politicised one – better outcomes will not be easily achieved.
33 Sir Geoffrey and Matthew Palmer propose a register of MPs’ interests (and a register of lobbyists) in their book Bridled power (1997),
page 201.  They argue – rightly in our view – that it might be prudent to take action now in this area before an incident presses home its
necessity.
34 The Crown’s objective for the Treaty settlement process is to provide full and final redress for past injustices.  Redress focuses on the
restoration of rights and the Crown seeks no conditions on how Mäori use any settlement assets.56      Towards an Inclusive Economy
Among the issues that warrant consideration are:
•The continued apparent preference by many claimants for a Waitangi Tribunal
report over direct negotiations with the Crown.
•The consequent demand on the Tribunal’s capacity (both funding and membership)
and the need to produce consistently high-quality reports.
•The respective roles of Parliament and the Executive in the Treaty process.
•The declining public constituency for the settlements process.
These issues are discussed in greater detail in Annex C.
Strengthening Mäori social capability and governance
Good governance and stronger social capability are closely linked.  Developing both of
these in the Mäori community is problematic, as it involves facilitating the
participation of very broad communities of interest, where members may not be aware
of their standing (see Box 3.7).
Key issues for both Mäori and the Crown are to create structures that reflect the
fluidity of Mäori social processes, and that span and link internal interests rather than
compartmentalise them.  These structures should also enable efficient allocative
decision-making and fair distributional processes.  It will be desirable to reshape
governance arrangements to reflect changing circumstances, and to further develop
key “bridging” capacities, such as high-quality executive skills, strategic links,
effective leadership, and broad participation of group members.
Possible actions by government to help strengthen Mäori governance, and so social
capability, are:
•Facilitating the “enabling environment” for Mäori civil society by reviving work on
an area of public law important to Mäori governance:  the reform of the Mäori Trust
Boards Act 1955 and the review of the Mäori Community Development Act 1962.
•Building the constituency for good governance, through such things as facilitating
the availability of “best practice” models and better linking with relevant agencies
in the Mäori governance area.
•Encouraging those Mäori institutions that receive public funding to investigate ways
to collaborate and build links with each other at the strategic and human (including
cultural) capital development levels.  This sharing should extend to the private
sector and internationally.
•Considering how to unlock the productive potential of multiply owned Mäori land
through on-going reform of the land tenure system.
These actions are discussed in greater detail in Annex C.Towards an Inclusive Economy      57
Beyond the general enabling environment for Mäori civil society, more specific
capacity building is also important.  One general initiative that offers a range of
potential pay-offs with respect to Mäori social capability is the Mäori Registration
Service (MRS), which will assist groups to compile accurate and comprehensive
registers of their members – see Box 3.8.
Box 3.7: Building Mäori social capability
Building social capability among Mäori interests requires, at the least, that policies be based on an
accurate conceptualisation of Mäori social dynamics.
Major elements of this are a recognition that:
• Traditional forms of Mäori governance have fundamentally changed, heralding changes in
notions of identity and how common interests may be articulated and expressed.
• Social capability exists both in and outside of the traditional kinship-based social structures.
The outside structures include the many voluntary and informal networks and relationships that
prevail in Mäori (as in other) communities.
• Non-tribal and pan-tribal forms of affiliation have become more pronounced, and it is likely
that in some cases they are the preferred basis for expression of Mäori community aspirations.
Nevertheless, kinship-based organisations remain extremely important to Mäori social and economic
development.  Iwi governance must accommodate a unique set of circumstances including:
• Mixed social, economic and cultural/political objectives.
• Dispersed members whose entitlements may not yet be specified.
• Distributing benefits derived from collective rights.
• Rebuilding communities of interest or creating them de novo.
• Specifying appropriate internal levels of responsibility and accountability that reflect the
make-up and history of internal constituencies – for example, reflecting any rights exercised at
the hapü or whänau level, and any incumbent obligations.
• Evolving new forms of governance that reflect norms of both tikanga and Western democratic
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Box 3.8: The Mäori Registration Service
One general initiative that offers a range of potential pay-offs with respect to Mäori social capability is
the Mäori Registration Service (MRS), which will assist groups to compile accurate and comprehensive
registers of their members. This would give Mäori organisations a valuable administrative tool for the
running of their affairs.  In return, the Crown could expect:
• Increased momentum for the Treaty settlements process, since claimant groups would have to
devote less time and fewer resources to building registers.
• Greater assurance that Mäori organisations would be accountable for the management of their
resources.
• Enhanced ability of Mäori organisations to distribute benefits widely amongst their members,
including those living outside their traditional tribal rohe.
The MRS will also assist Mäori to research their tribal affiliations, and to link with other Mäori
organisations.  It may also benefit economic development through the more effective administration and
utilisation of Mäori land.
Decentralisation and service delivery
Decentralisation of service delivery is likely to be a key issue in Crown-Mäori
relationships, as Mäori aspirations for autonomous institutions build35.  There has
been worthwhile progress in this area but some problems have surfaced.  The
following would help to address these and better manage risks for all parties:
improved community and iwi governance, developing managerial skills and culture for
meeting contracted outputs and achieving desired outcomes.  Widespread
decentralisation will also give rise to issues such as managing people’s entitlement to
services from different providers and lines of accountability that will require close
consideration.
It is very important that current initiatives in capacity building, and the
decentralisation of service delivery to Mäori organisations, are properly evaluated.
This concern arises not least because the speed of implementation of initiatives has
limited the opportunity to co-ordinate approaches across government departments.
Welcome as it is, evaluation of these initiatives is only now under preparation.
Changes in local government need to address some key questions
The current review of the Local Government Act (LGA) 1974 is considering important
changes to the powers and accountability of local government in New Zealand.  These
contemplate providing local government with some form of power of general
competence to undertake a wider range of discretionary activities, while continuing to
prescribe coercive and regulatory powers.
35 The current wide-ranging debate on Mäori self-determination and shared sovereignty is likely to continue and to influence these
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A virtue of current arrangements is the relatively clear separation between central
and sub-national roles and responsibilities. With one or two exceptions such as roads,
local governments raise their revenues from their own dedicated tax base, and
expenditure responsibilities are clearly allocated to either central or sub-national
levels.
It will be important to ensure that the advantages of current arrangements, in terms
of clear accountability associated with separation of roles, are not lost sight of.  A
“partnership approach” between central and local government, or between
government and the voluntary sector and/or Mäori organisations, can mean many
different things.  It is very important to be clear about precisely what is involved, and
what the implications of the different approaches are.  There are accountability risks,
policy and effectiveness risks, and fiscal risks in this area.
Key questions that need to be addressed are:
•What functions should be centralised and what should be delegated?
•What are the relative benefits and costs of decentralisation versus devolution36?
•Under a decentralisation approach, what are the different ways in which local
community views can be brought to bear in the decisions of central government
agencies?
•If Parliament devolves additional power to local government, how can it ensure that
local government acts in accordance with the wishes of those who provide it with
funding and for whom its powers are exercised?  Local government elections are
part of this, but by themselves are insufficient.
These issues are being explored in the current LGA review.
It would also be highly desirable for any fundamental changes in the powers,
accountability and funding of local government in New Zealand to be preceded by
some in-depth comparative review of recent experiences in New Zealand and
elsewhere with devolution and decentralisation.
New Zealanders’ values and attitudes affect politics, society and the economy
There is growing recognition that the effective functioning of politics, the economy and
society depends to some extent on the existence of a core set of values that promote
social cohesion and facilitate social and economic exchanges.  The recently initiated
NZ Herald  “Common core debate” (http://www.nzherald.co.nz) suggests a need to
pay more attention to the articulation and fostering of core values in New Zealand.
Core values for social cohesion do not imply uniformly shared values but would include
mutual respect and tolerance for the values and life-styles of others.
36 Decentralisation involves delegating decision-making powers within central government agencies to managers in local offices, for
example the Regional Employment Commissioners in DWI. Devolution involves the transfer of decision-making powers to sub-national
government, for example as occurred under the Resource Management Act; or to locally elected Boards, as occurred under the Tomorrow’s
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One of the few mechanisms available to the Government to influence directly the
formation of social norms and values is the compulsory education curriculum.  Bi-
cultural awareness has for some time been an important part of the curriculum.
Greater emphasis to values important for New Zealand’s social capability and
economic performance and to key elements of New Zealand’s institutional
environment could be considered.  Given the key contribution of human capital to
well-being, it would also be desirable to promote a consensus on the importance of
educational achievement for the individual and society.
The family is important to the well-being of children, and in particular to human
capital formation and the fostering of social values (Ormerod and Rowthorn, 2001).
Given this, there would be value in investigating further the impact of family law on
well-being, in particular through its impact on family formation, dissolution and the
life chances of children.
There is further discussion in Annex C of the effects of changes in divorce law on
outcomes for children.
Conclusions
While New Zealand enjoys a good reputation internationally for the quality of its
public sector governance, there are a number of factors that suggest further
strengthening of governance is needed in the following areas:
•Greater accountability for the outcomes of government activities.
•Strengthening Mäori institutions and governance to complement the existing Treaty
settlements process.
•A review of recent experiences in New Zealand and elsewhere with devolution and
decentralisation before any fundamental changes are made to the powers,
accountability and funding of local government, or any significant initiatives are
taken on a “partnership” between government and non-government organisations.
•Strengthening systems to reinforce ethical behaviour in public institutions,
particularly Parliament.
•Additional transparency in the process for public appointments.
There are few means available to government to influence the evolution of social
norms.  One is the compulsory education curriculum, where consideration could be
given to further emphasising mutually respected values.  Officials should also assess
the effects of different approaches to family law in terms of social outcomes for
children.
Issues of institutions and values are core areas of government action. They have major
impacts on the well-being of New Zealanders, both directly through opportunities for
democratic participation and the protection of important individual freedoms, and
indirectly through their impact on the functioning of society and on economic growth.Towards an Inclusive Economy      61
There are also important links between the functioning of government institutions and
the other elements in the Inclusive Economy framework. For instance, improved
understanding and reporting of the results of government action contribute to better
policy and more effective implementation across the whole of government, including
education, labour market, regional development and macro-economic policies.
Government initiatives in the areas of institutions and values need not necessarily
involve significant direct fiscal costs. Their main cost would be the opportunity cost of
Ministers’ and officials’ time.
These factors suggest that initiatives to strengthen governance and further consider
the role of government in fostering social norms should be seen as an important
component of a mixed strategy in creating a more inclusive economy.62      Towards an Inclusive Economy
4 Conclusions
An inclusive economy is about directing policy at ensuring opportunities for people’s
broad-based participation in society and the economy, with the ultimate objective of
improving the well-being of all New Zealanders.  The focus on inclusiveness derives
from the importance – both as an end and a means – of broad participation of people
in the economy and society.
This report is not intended to develop detailed policy recommendations.  The inclusive
economy framework and the key messages and themes that have emerged from our
review of theory, evidence and their application to New Zealand’s current situation
point to a general policy direction to inform and guide detailed policy.
At the heart of this is a clear objective – raising well-being for all – and a high-level
plan of attack for how to go about achieving it.  The plan would couch policy in terms
of our inclusive economy framework by recognising the multi-faceted nature of
well-being, the role of economic performance and social capability as drivers of
well-being, and the potential for mutually reinforcing inter-relationships between
economic performance and social capability.
While acknowledging New Zealand’s strengths, it is not difficult to point to areas in
which New Zealand currently falls short.  Average material living standards have
fallen relative to most other OECD countries; income inequality increased particularly
in the late 1980s; the incidence of household poverty is too high; there are wide gaps
in ethnic averages across a range of social indicators37, there are poor outcomes in
health and education among lower socio-economic groups; there are quite sharp
divisions in values and attitudes on key socio-economic issues; and there are
institutional weaknesses that trouble Crown-Mäori aspirations and our levels of social
capability more generally.
Added to this is a regional picture of increasing deprivation in Northland and parts of
Auckland, and stagnation in East Cape.  Finally, there is the threat of more skilled
young New Zealanders leaving for what they see as more prosperous foreign countries
that are putting out the welcome mat for them.
Making use of our report’s themes and key messages for shaping policy on the
inclusive economy, it is possible to construct a high-level plan of action to address
these problems.  It would have a distinctive logic and a number of features as follows:
• Growth is still very important and policy should take care not to undermine the
productivity and dynamism of a healthy market economy.  Growth helps the poor as
well.  The need for social cohesion means taking account of the social consequences
of growth (e.g. as far as possible avoiding the creation of new groups of
disadvantage and/or exclusion).
37 The work of Chapple (2000) shows that the distributions of individual outcomes behind the ethnic averages overlap each other signifi-
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• Many of the problems referred to above are a result of individuals and households
having low absolute levels of income.  Low skills and levels of education typically
drive this.  New Zealand has a poor comparative record in outcomes in the lower
part of the distribution of educational achievement compared to its generally good
performance in the upper half.  Early interventions, aimed at increasing the literacy
and numeracy skills of the bottom quintile will be most cost-effective in the long
term.  Carefully targeted, intensive pre-school interventions can be effective for the
most disadvantaged, but ensuring basic skills acquisition during primary schooling
is of particular importance.
• While necessary as a short-term safety net, the tax-benefit transfer system is not a
realistic or desirable option to tackle in a sustainable way the problem of low
absolute levels of income.  Limits on the effectiveness of “passive” tax-benefit
redistribution arise from the costs to growth of high marginal rates of tax, the
international mobility of high-skill, high-income people, and the risks to social
cohesion from having a large and expensive group of taxpayer-funded beneficiaries.
• An “active” approach to raising low incomes through policies that improve
education and labour-market opportunities in the lower part of the distribution
offers the best prospect to make a difference to distributional outcomes over the
medium term.  This is supported by a considerable weight of empirical evidence.
Moreover investing in education and increasing labour-market participation are
robust ways to improve social capability in dimensions such as increasing economic
and social participation, increasing trust, improving health and reducing crime and
victimisation. This win-win character of active policies makes them particularly
attractive.
• Identifying as priorities education and jobs to improve outcomes for the less well off
would enable the Government to rank demands on its scarce fiscal resources.
Followed consistently over the medium term, such an approach would enable it to
demonstrate steady progress towards increasing well-being for all.  These policies
should be funded first from better use of existing resources.  However, additional
resources may be necessary.
• Tertiary education is an important instrument for promoting economic growth and,
through that, well-being.  New Zealand has high levels of participation, but there is
room to increase the numbers of centres with world-class research and teaching,
and that facilitate technology transfer to industry.  This is likely to be more about
good institutional design than funding.
• There is also a range of institutional reforms that offer the prospect of sound returns
in terms of well-being, at little fiscal cost.  Those institutional reforms that would
improve transparency, trust, voice and participation in decision making are good for
well-being not only directly (because they are intrinsically part of that concept), but
also through increased social capability and, to a lesser extent, improved economic
performance. They include improving accountability for the results of government
activities;  strengthening Mäori institutions and governance; and initiatives to
strengthen ethical safeguards in public institutions.64      Towards an Inclusive Economy
• One issue that has emerged as important across a range of areas is improved
understanding of the effects of government policies. Improving the evidence base for
government policy will require improving the effectiveness of research and
evaluation activities across the public sector.
• There are a number of areas that are suggested for further assessment. These
include improving our understanding of regional migration in New Zealand, and the
best mix of people-based and place-based interventions; a review of recent New
Zealand experience with devolution and decentralisation as a precursor to any
decisions on changes in the role of local government in New Zealand; the adequacy
of Parliament’s access to independent expert advice to fulfil its review functions; the
possible value of reinforcing mutually respected values in the education curriculum;
and investigating the impact of family law on well-being, particularly its effects on
families and the life chances of children.
Finally, a key insight of this project is that there is a small number of key areas where
there appear to be opportunities for significant gains for equity and participation,
while being neutral or even positive for growth.  The areas are education and jobs in
the lower parts of the distributions of attainment and skills; Mäori institutions and
governance; and improving understanding, and reporting, of the results of
government action. These areas should receive increased government attention.Towards an Inclusive Economy      65
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Annex B: Tables summarising channels and mechanisms linking selected policy “themes”
with well-being in an inclusive economy
This Annex sets out in greater detail the many possible channels and mechanisms that
can operate to influence behaviours and outcomes.  The information is presented in
five tables that cover most of the key themes in the paper.  The tables describe the
linkages between:
B1 Jobs and well-being
B2 Growth and income distribution and well-being
B3 Good governance and well-being
B4 Shared values and well-being
B5 Human capital and well-being
Each table shows separately those channels of influence that can be considered as
relatively direct and those that are indirect, for example by operating through some
intermediate component.  Some tables also identify the presence of vicious or virtuous
circles to highlight the dynamic nature of many processes.
In order to present a full picture, cost-benefit appraisals of policy proposals ought to
take account of all the various channels through which benefits and costs can affect
well-being.  This can be difficult in practice where quantitative estimates of impacts
are unavailable.  In these cases, the likely influence based on the best available
evidence should nevertheless be taken into account in the overall qualitative
judgement about the value of the proposal.Towards an Inclusive Economy      77
Table B.1: Summary of linkages between jobs and well-being
Channel  Mechanism  Evidence 
Direct channels     
1.  Psychological and health 
effects of employment 
Having a job = greater satisfaction + 
higher self-esteem irrespective of 
income gains or losses 
Losing a job or anticipating loss of a job 
associated with poorer mental and 
physical health 
Old argument in terms of the “dignity of 
labour” (Jaboda, 1979).  Strong 
evidence that having a job is positive for 
well-being for most people, particularly 
overall life satisfaction and mental 
health (Wadsworth, 1991; Jenkins, 
2001).  However, hints that some sub-
groups can lose “work ethic” so 
joblessness ceases to reduce well-being 
in the same way as formerly.  This may 
depend on scope for participation in the 
informal economy 
2.  Effects through greater 
social participation, less 
exclusion, higher social cohesion 
Being in work leads to richer set of 
social relationships/networks.  Work 
habits (e.g. punctuality, responsibility) 
are generally pro-social and build trust.  
Less welfare dependence builds social 
cohesion 
Increasingly large proportion of social 
contacts derived via work so work 
assumes greater significance for social 
connection, Putnam (2000) 
Indirect channels     
3.  More people in paid work 
increases well-being via higher 
material output and growth and 
higher average material living 
standards 
Higher labour market participation, 
lower unemployment, and lower 
likelihood of needing to use cash 
benefits 
Abundant evidence since this is the 
orthodox position.  Most evaluations of 
labour market interventions look at this 
channel exclusively.  Getting the long-
term unemployed into jobs does not 
significantly increase upward wage 
pressures.  Some active labour market 
policies reduce benefit costs, paying for 
themselves (see below) (Michalopoulos 
et al 2000) 
4.  Higher human capital  People in work add to or at least 
maintain their human capital through 
on-the-job experience/training.  
Increases in skills lead to increases in 
productivity, leading to increase in 
supply of employment 
 
5.  Through less poverty and 
inequality 
Less poverty and inequality associated 
with increased sense of fairness, better 
health, crime etc outcomes 
Effects depend on wage levels of jobs 
which people take and proportion of the 
poor who find jobs.  Full-time work 
seems effective in taking poor people 
out of poverty Freeman (2001; Jenkins 
2001) 
6.  Via impact on crime, drug 
abuse, etc 
Young males in employment generally 
found to exhibit lower likelihood of 
criminal behaviour 
Old idea of “the Devil finds work for 
idle hands” 
7.  Stimulating disadvantaged 
communities 
Getting more people into work in a 
socially and economically lagging 
community can help break mutually 
reinforcing patterns of deprivation 
 
8.  Through impact on child care 
and the quality of family life 
Getting single parents into jobs could 
increase or decrease quality of child 
care 
Effects likely to depend on other 
supportive policies (e.g. subsidised, 
affordable child care) (Duncan and 
Chase-Lansdale, 2001) 
 78      Towards an Inclusive Economy
Table B.1: Summary of linkages between jobs and well-being (continued)
Channel  Mechanism  Evidence 
Virtuous circles     
9.  Interactions between 
material output and social 
capability 
More people in jobs leading to higher 
social capital (better social skills, 
health, trust, networks) gives better 
economic performance and vice versa 
Evidence is accumulating rapidly, but is 
relatively new and can be challenged 
10.  Inter-generational 
transmission 
Households with children in which at 
least one adult is in work associated 
with better outcomes for pre-adolescent 
children; limited evidence of increases 
in school problems and risky behaviour 
in adolescents 
Likely to be income effects and role 
modelling, (Duncan and Chase-
Lansdale, 2001) 
 
Table B.2:Summary of linkages between growth and income distribution and well-being
Link codes:   + greater equality and growth are complementary
  ~ greater equality and growth are in opposition
  ? inconclusive
Link  Channel  Mechanism  Evidence 
  Indirect channels     
?  1.  Adaptation to cross-
sector differences in 
productivity 
Growth causes the earnings distribution to 
widen initially and then narrow as people 
progressively move from low to higher 
productivity sectors 
Industrialised countries’ 
income inequality declined 
over the longer term (to 
1970s) (Kuznets, 1955; 
Barro, 2000) 
~  2.  Effect on savings 
propensity 
A wider market income distribution raises the 
average savings propensity and hence 
investment and growth 
Lewis (1954), Kaldor 
(1956,1957), Stiglitz (1969) 
+  3.  Capital market 
imperfections 
A wider income distribution associated with 
capital market imperfections prevents poor 
families from investing in human capital 
improvement, which inhibits growth 
Galor and Zeira (1993), 
Perotti (1993) 
+  4.  Fertility and human 
capital investment decisions 
A more equal income distribution shifts the 
balance of advantage between having children 
and investing in human capital towards the 
latter, suggesting that greater income equality 
has a positive effect on growth 
Negative correlation between 
income inequality and 
secondary school enrolment 
rates  (Galor and Zang, 1993, 
Becker, Murphy and Tamura, 
1990) 
~  5.  Redistribution through 
taxes and transfers 
Social protection policies can harm incentives 
and allocative efficiency 
Mirlees (1971) 
~  6.  Wage compression  Artificial wage compression can reduce 
growth, since skilled workers in an open 
economy can migrate, lowering the average 
skill level and growth potential 
Bowles (2000) 
?  7.  Some forms of 
egalitarian redistribution 
can work without harming 
growth 
Eliminating wage disparities among similar 
workers puts pressure on low productivity 
firms 
Bowles (2000) 
 Towards an Inclusive Economy      79
Channel  Mechanism  Evidence 
Direct channels     
1.  Through protecting important 
political, civil and individual 
freedoms that are themselves 
constitutive of well-being 
Enabling institutions such as free 
democratic elections, an independent 
judiciary, legal protections for free 
speech and human rights; protection of 
minority rights 
Well-being entails the protection of 
political, civil and individual 
freedoms 
2.  Through enabling greater 
democratic participation 
Access to official information; explicit 
consultative mechanisms 
Appropriate decentralisation of 
expenditure responsibilities to sub-
national governments. 
Well-being entails providing for 
democratic participation, (Huther 
and Shah, 1998) 
3.  Through facilitating social 
interactions and economic exchange 
Enabling environment for economic 
exchange, such as secure property 
rights, security of contract 
Enabling environment for civil society, 
such as legal framework for civil society 
organisations, freedom of expression, a 
free press, open government 
Well-being entails facilitating social 
interactions and economic 
exchange.  For evidence on the 
instrumental effect of good 
governance on economic exchange 
see channel 5 below 
 
Table B.2: Summary of linkages between growth and income distribution and well-being
(continued)
Link  Channel  Mechanism  Evidence 
  Indirect channels (cont’d)     
~  8.  Lobbying for assistance  Extensive social protection can reduce growth 
since it rewards efforts to lobby for allocation 
of funds, distracts people from wealth 
creation and erodes innovative capacity 
Lindbeck (1995) 
~  9.  Income inequality shapes 
the level and time path of 
demand for an innovator’s 
product 
Innovation and hence growth will be 
encouraged if there are plenty of middle-
income earners who can afford to buy newly 
developed products 
Zweimuller (2000) 
+  10.  Addressing people who 
lose out from growth 
reforms 
Social protection investments that pay 
attention to people who potentially adversely 
affected, promotes political support for 
undertaking growth-promoting reforms 
Rodrik (1997) 
+  11.  Social cohesion and 
room to manoeuvre 
A relatively equal distribution of income can 
facilitate growth when it is associated with an 
absence of social divisions and ethnic 
heterogeneity.  Social cohesion and strong 
institutions give politicians greater room to 
manoeuvre 
Ritzen, Easterley and 
Woolcock (2000) 
+  12.  Social unrest  Excessive income inequality can cause social 
and political unrest, which inhibits investment 
and growth 
Perotti (1996), Latin 
American literature 
+  13.  Political reaction to 
extreme disparities 
Excessively wide market income distribution 
can give rise to political support for extensive 
redistribution, the fiscal effects of which can 
inhibit growth performance 
Higher income inequality at 
the start of an earlier year 
had a negative impact on 
growth in the subsequent 
period.  (Persson and 
Tabellini, 1994; Alesina and 
Rodrik, 1994), political 
economy literature 
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Table B.3: Summary of linkages between good governance and well-being (continued)
Channel  Mechanism  Evidence 
Direct channels (cont’d)     
Impact of improved “citizen voice” via 
a free press on equity of government 
policies 
Dreze and Sen (1989) 
Less corrupt, more open public sector 
governance 
World Economic Forum (2001) 
4.  Through contributing directly to 
better outcomes, such as life 
expectancy, literacy, and the quality 
of the physical environment. 
Decentralisation of expenditure 
responsibilities to sub-national 
governments 
Huther and Shah (1998) 
Indirect channels     
Effective protection of property rights 
increases investment and incentives to 
produce and save 
Political and civil freedoms facilitate 
the emergence of shared norms, such as 
trust and tolerance, and social values 
such as the importance of education or 
attitudes toward the environment.  
Shared norms in turn facilitate the 
achievement of social consensus (i.e. the 
reduction of transactions costs) that 
facilitates more efficient collective 
action and economic exchange 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobatón (1999) 
Corruption lowers incentives to invest 
by both domestic and foreign investors, 
by acting as an at times highly 




Corruption distorts the composition of 
government spending, away from 
education and towards large-scale 
capital projects where it is easier to 
extract bribes 
Mauro (1996) 
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) 
Basic civil liberties facilitate greater 
citizen voice and hence more effective 
government 
Isham, Kaufman and Pritchett 
(1997) 
A more extensive and effective civil 
society is associated with higher 
economic output 
Central bank independence leads to 
lower inflation and higher growth 
Putnam (1993) 
5.  Through higher economic output 
Greater transparency and accountability 
strengthen incentives for earlier policy 
adjustments, and prevent the costly 
accumulation of problems (the post-Asia 
crisis Washington consensus) 
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 
(1992) 
6.  Through strengthening state 
capability 
Corruption and the absence of the rule 
of law are correlated with a larger 
share of the unofficial economy in GDP 
Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-
Lobatón (1998) 
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Table B.3: Summary of linkages between good governance and well-being (continued)
Channel  Mechanism  Evidence 
Virtuous and vicious circles     
7.  Interactions between political 
and civil freedoms, and the 
evolution of shared norms 
The exercise of freedom is mediated by 
values, but the values in turn are 
influenced by public discussions and 
social interactions, which are 
themselves influenced by participatory 
freedoms (Sen 1999) 
See Table B.4 for discussion of the 
channels through which shared 
norms impact on well-being 
8.  Interactions between declining 
state capability and the extent of 
the unofficial economy 
As state capability declines, taxpayers 
receive lower quality public services 
(e.g. poor contract enforcement, 
protection of private property) and shift 
activities underground, further 
weakening state capability.  Process can 
work in reverse, although many states 
appear trapped in a low-level 
equilibrium 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobatón (1999) 
9.  Interactions between 
participatory democracy and basic 
education skills 
Democratic participation requires basic 
education skills such as literacy and 
numeracy; widespread democratic 
participation in turn is correlated with 
higher education spending 
Mauro (1996) 
 
Channel  Mechanism  Evidence 
Indirect channels     
1.  Through higher economic output  Social divisions, in terms of ethnicity 
and income (and corrupt public 
institutions) result in an inability to 
generate social consensus, reducing the 
ability to adjust to economic shocks 
Trust and shared values reduce 
transaction costs in the private sector; 
may encourage investment 
Trust and shared values increase state 
effectiveness through voluntary 
compliance with laws, taxes and 
regulations 
Rodrik (1999 and 2000) 
Easterly (1999) 
Easterly (2000) 
Knack and Keefer (1997) 
La Porta et al (1997) 
Virtuous and vicious circles     
2.  Interactions between trust, 
social and economic interactions, 
and the effectiveness of institutions 
Trust facilitates social and economic 
interactions, and enhances the 
effectiveness of institutions.  Effective 
institutions in turn further build trust 
La Porta et al (1997) 
3.  Interactions between shared 
values and economic growth 
Social cohesion may contribute to 
higher economic output (as above); and 
economic growth may in turn contribute 
to social cohesion by changing 
individuals’ subjective feelings about the 
degree of well-being they derive from 
belonging to their society 
Bates (1996) 
 
Table B.4: Summary of linkages between shared values and well-being82      Towards an Inclusive Economy
Table B.5: Summary of linkages between human capital and well-being
Table B.4: Summary of linkages between shared values and well-being (continued)
Channel  Mechanism  Evidence 
Direct channels     
1.  Exercise of freedom and choice  More education = more freedom and 
happiness 
Blanchflower and Oswald (2000) 
2.  Via impact on health-related 
habits and lifestyles 
More educated people found to have 
healthier habits and lifestyles (not just 
effect of greater knowledge, but 
independent effect of educational level); 
e.g. lower smoking, lower obesity and 
higher exercise levels 
Wolfe and Haveman (2001) 
Indirect channels     
3.  Through higher income and 
growth 
Higher labour-market participation, 
lower unemployment, higher 
productivity, and lower likelihood of 
needing to use cash benefits 
Temple (2000); Wolfe and Haveman 
(2001); OECD (2000) 
4.  Through greater social 
participation, less exclusion, higher 
social cohesion 
Being in work, or just being more 
educated leads to richer set of social 
relationships/networks.  Higher social 
and political participation, higher trust 
and more volunteering associated with 
higher levels of education 
Helliwell and Putnam (1999); 
Verba, Scholzman and Brady 
(1995) 
5.  Through less poverty  Human capital investment can raise 
earnings prospects for disadvantaged 
children.  Less poverty is associated 
with an increased sense of fairness, 
better health, crime etc outcomes 
Comer, J.P. (1988) 
6.  Via impact on crime  Better educated people are generally 
found to exhibit lower likelihood of 
criminal behaviour.  More education 
associated with lower costs of crime 
(e.g. lower law enforcement and victim 
costs) 
Wolfe and Haveman (2001); 
Behrman and Stacey (1997) 
7.  Through tackling disadvantaged 
communities 
Installing a high-quality education 
infrastructure in a socially and 
economically lagging community can 
help overcome negative neighbourhood 
effects 
Strengthening Education in 
Mangere and Otara (SEMO) 
initiative 
 
Channel  Mechanism  Evidence 
Virtuous and vicious circles     
4.  Lack of trust can be very 
difficult to break down 
A lack of generalised interpersonal trust 
is associated with lack of social and 
economic interactions.  In the absence 
of such interactions, it is difficult to 
revise one’s view of the trustworthiness 
of others.  In a low trust society it is 
rational to exploit others rather than to 
trust them 
Putnam (1993) 
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Channel  Mechanism  Evidence 
Virtuous circles     
8.  Interactions between material 
output and social capability 
Education leading to higher social 
capital (health, trust, networks) through 
social skills, gives better economic 
performance and vice versa.  Number of 
years of schooling is the most robust 
correlate of social capital variables 
Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote 
(2000); Glaeser (2001) 
9.  Inter-generational transmission  Higher human capital in one generation 
is associated with higher human capital 
in the next 
Sandefur, McLanahan and 
Wotjtkiewicz (1989) 
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Annex C: Institutions and Values
Strengthening governance, institutions and values in New Zealand
Attention to the quality of governance in New Zealand is likely to have significant
pay-offs for the quality of democracy and to a lesser extent for economic performance.
Some concrete proposals for strengthening institutions and values in New Zealand are
raised below that may make a sizeable impact and that the Government is well placed
to attend to.  There are also other areas where further work may be worthwhile
because they may help identify additional opportunities for effective reform and/or
managing emerging risks.
Greater accountability for the results of government activities
Accountability for the results achieved by government action is fundamental to good
governance.  There is reason to be concerned that in some areas New Zealand lags
behind other developed countries in this respect. In particular, accountability for the
outcomes of government spending, taxation, and the operation of monetary policy
needs to be strengthened.
Accountability for the outcomes of government spending is widely acknowledged to
have proven a weak part of our public management system (Petrie and Webber,
2001).  A necessary condition for this accountability is good quality information.
There is a lack of adequate information on the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of
government spending – even allowing for New Zealand’s small size and the high cost
of good research and evaluation.  Access to such information would also contribute
directly to well-being in Sen’s view (Sen, 1999).
Citizens’ charters, like those implemented in the United Kingdom, could inform the
public about the service they can reasonably expect from departments and similar
agencies, as well as strengthening departments’ accountability for the services they
provide to the public.
Public expenditure
An initiative towards the goal of better information about the results of public
spending might be moves towards publishing outcome statements by broad sector or
major portfolio area, and comprehensive reporting of these at a whole-of-government
level.  These could contain carefully selected outcome indicators, including both
“state-of-the-nation” statistics and the outcomes achieved by major interventions.
This may help to prompt more informed debate about the effectiveness of government
policies and programmes.  The importance of comprehensive outcome reporting,
together with better research and evaluation, is being increasingly recognised as a
means of achieving more integrated and coherent policies38.
At the same time initiatives could be taken to generate a greater focus on results at
the individual departmental level. This could be done by driving strategic plans off an
outcome focus, and measuring value for money in outcome terms. Treasury is
currently discussing this sort of approach with the State Services Commission with a
view to piloting it with interested departments.
38 For instance, the OECD’s current work on sustainable development (OECD 2001c).Towards an Inclusive Economy      85
Tax policy and the conduct of monetary policy
There are also weaknesses on the tax side.  While the Generic Tax Policy Process
(GTPP) has been developed to improve the operational and legislative phases, there is
little transparency or attention given to desired tax policy outcomes at an aggregate
level.   There is also a lack of information on tax expenditures, limited (and non-
independent) post-implementation reviews of new tax policies, and a lack of
disinterested, independent policy analysis of tax policy. Remedies that could be
considered include requirements for governments to publish a statement of their
desired tax policy outcomes and progress in achieving them; regular publication of
tax expenditure statements; and increased resourcing and involvement of independent
policy analysts.
In a parliamentary system, particularly one with a unicameral House, significant
power is vested in the hands of a government that can command a majority in
Parliament.  An important check on the effectiveness of the executive is exercised
through the scrutiny activities of select committees of Parliament.
The recent Monetary Policy Review recommended greater resourcing of Parliament’s
Finance and Expenditure Committee (FEC) to enable it to review the effectiveness of
monetary policy more effectively39.
Enabling adequate parliamentary scrutiny of tax law is a particularly thorny issue.
The complexity of tax policy and law is such that current knowledge of tax policy
principles and tax practice is vital to understanding tax law.  The problem is the
stakes are high and that every person with this knowledge is conflicted, either by
being an advisor to the Government or to business.  In addition competent advisors
are very expensive.  Providing adequate scrutiny may require an independent
advisory body to be established.
These are specific instances of a much more general issue.  Adequate scrutiny by
Parliament is one with a potentially high pay-off in terms of the quality of governance.
It is worthy of further in-depth consideration.
Initiatives to strengthen accountability for the results of government activities in
areas such as spending, taxation and monetary policy could result over time in
somewhat less policy instability, as improved evidence and knowledge about “what
works” narrows the scope for hasty or ill-considered policy change.
The role of local government
The current review of the Local Government Act (LGA) 1974 is considering important
changes to the powers and accountability of local government in New Zealand.
A virtue of current arrangements is the relatively clear separation between central
and sub-national roles and responsibilities. With one or two exceptions such as roads,
local governments raise their revenues from their own dedicated tax base, and
expenditure responsibilities are clearly allocated to either central or sub-national
levels.
39 The Review also recommended a number of changes to current accountability arrangements for the implementation of monetary policy
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Key questions that the current arrangements raise, however, are:
• Are we too centralised?
• What are the relative benefits and costs of decentralisation versus devolution?
Decentralisation involves delegating decision-making powers within central
government agencies to managers in local offices, for example the Regional
Employment Commissioners in the Department of Work and Income.  Devolution
involves the transfer of decision-making powers to sub-national government, for
example as occurred under the Resource Management Act 1991; or to locally
elected Boards, as occurred under Tomorrow’s Schools.
• Under a decentralisation approach, what are the different ways in which local
community views can be brought to bear in the decisions of central government
agencies? One example is the Local Management Group structure set up under the
Strengthening Families initiative, which brings together representatives of central
government agencies, local government, and the non-government sector in
discussions about local needs and service priorities for children at risk. Other
approaches being considered in the current review of the LGA include formal joint
strategic planning exercises between central and local government.
If Parliament devolves additional power to local government, how can it ensure that
local government acts in accordance with the wishes of those who provide it with
funding and on whom those powers are exercised?  Local government elections are
part of this, but by themselves insufficient.
It would be highly desirable for any fundamental changes in the powers,
accountability and funding of local government in New Zealand to be preceded by
some in-depth comparative review of recent experiences in New Zealand with
devolution and decentralisation. An investigation of experience with the Resource
Management Act (devolution), the current framework for roading (overlapping roles
and mixed funding), and the Strengthening Families initiative and Regional
Employment Commissioners (decentralisation) could highlight interesting features of
these very different approaches, and provide important insights for policy. This could
usefully be combined with some careful assessment of arrangements in selected
relevant countries.
It will also be important to ensure that the advantages of current arrangements, in
terms of clear accountability associated with separation of roles, are not lost sight of.
A “partnership approach” between central and local government, or between
government and the voluntary sector and/or Mäori organisations, can mean many
different things. It is very important to be clear about precisely what is involved, and
what the implications of the different approaches are. There are accountability risks,
policy and effectiveness risks, and fiscal risks in this area. These issues are being
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New Zealanders’ values and attitudes
There is a growing recognition that the effective functioning of politics, the economy
and society depends to some extent on the existence of a core set of common values
that promote social cohesion and facilitate social and economic exchanges.  The
recently initiated NZ Herald “Common Core Debate” (http://www.nzherald.co.nz) is
suggestive of a need to pay more attention to the articulation and fostering of core
values in New Zealand.
One of the few mechanisms the Government has to directly influence the formation of
social norms and values is the compulsory education curriculum. Bi-cultural
awareness has for some time been an important part of the curriculum.  Greater
emphasis on values important for New Zealand’s social capability and economic
performance, and on key elements of New Zealand’s institutional environment could
be considered.  More productive school/family links may be a way to strengthen a
consensus on the importance of educational achievement for the individual and
society.
The importance of the family for the fostering of social values is widely acknowledged
in public discourse in New Zealand.  However, relatively little emphasis appears to
have been given to analysis of the potential effects of different approaches to family
law on family formation and dissolution, and the life chances for children. Recent
debates on the law regulating de facto and legal marriages, for instance, appear to
have focused on a rights-based approach, instead of considering empirical evidence
on the impact of different approaches on well-being.  For example, a recent article by
Gruber (2000) finds that adults who were exposed to unilateral divorce laws as
children are less well educated, have lower family incomes, are more likely to be
married earlier and are more likely to separate.
Given the importance of the family to the well-being of children, and in particular to
human capital formation and the fostering of social values, there would be value in
investigating further the impact of family law on well-being, in particular through its
impact on family formation, dissolution and the life chances of children.
Mäori institutions and values
Treaty of Waitangi process
From 1990, the inception of the direct negotiations process increased the incentives
for claimants to enter into negotiations with the Crown without first going through a
lengthy Waitangi Tribunal inquiry process.
Despite this, claimants strongly prefer the Tribunal process, reportedly because the
research and hearing processes are important catalysts to rebuild their communities
and because a Tribunal report will enhance the validity of their claim.  Those with
claims implicating Crown Forest and SOE assets also have an incentive to seek
remedies hearings by the Tribunal, contributing to a lengthy list of “claims in
waiting”.  This has placed major demands upon the Tribunal’s capacity, both its
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inquiry processes by requiring claimants to resolve cross-claim issues, have all
necessary research completed and encourage Crown and claimant counsel to identify
common issues as early as possible.
A recent High Court decision on litigation between claimants and the Waitangi
Tribunal also suggests that resourcing issues may need reconsideration by
government.  This decision expressed the judiciary’s concern about the “inadequacy of
the Tribunal’s resources” and that “systemic delays on the present scale prevent
proper discharge of (the Waitangi Tribunal’s) function” (McGechan, J. Te Runanga o
Ngai Tahu vs Waitangi Tribunal, April 2001).
For the decisions of the Tribunal to contribute to social cohesion, they must be seen to
be just by all sections of society.  Consideration of resourcing issues should therefore
also include the appointments process to the Tribunal, including access to sufficient
expertise to prepare consistently high-quality reports on matters likely to come before
it.  This consideration of resourcing issues should also consider the knock-on effect
that a larger Tribunal output will have for the Crown’s negotiations programme.
An issue that needs attention is agreement over the role of Parliament in the
settlements process.  Recent experience suggests that some Parliamentarians see the
select committee process as an opportunity to revise negotiated settlements.
Parliamentary oversight of the settlements process is of course fundamental.  The
issue, however, is to obtain the most effective division of roles between Parliament and
the Executive.  As with international treaties, this is likely to be an area where good
public policy requires delegation of negotiating authority by Parliament to the
Executive, within clearly prescribed limits.  This is an important area where
clarification of respective roles could strengthen both effectiveness and accountability.
A more narrow but difficult issue that needs to be addressed is the relatively weak and
probably declining public constituency for the settlements process (NZ Values Survey
1998, 1989 – see Perry and Webster, 1999) and the perception that the Waitangi
Tribunal is the direct source of unsustainable Mäori demands on the public purse.
Refining Tribunal processes as discussed above, and improving governance as
outlined below, should help.  The Government could also consider what it could do best
to improve the climate of public opinion on Treaty of Waitangi issues.
Strengthening Mäori social capability and governance
Good governance is important for Mäori asset management and in turn for
participation in the “inclusive economy”.  Strengthening Mäori social capability and
governance is a problematic process.  An attempt over a decade ago to create a
statutory basis for Mäori legal personality – in the form of the Iwi Runanga Act 1990
– proved contentious and short-lived as concern developed over the degree to which
such structures institutionalised the “authoritative voice” of iwi.
Other developments, such as the politicisation of the urban-rural Mäori debate,
particularly in the context of the Mäori fisheries litigation, highlight the contribution
that good governance arrangements can make to social capability through, for
example, developing trust between the parties and a constituency for disputes
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in requiring that assets be transferred to accountable asset management structures, it
has the balance right between a structured permissive approach with very general
governance criteria, and a somewhat more delineated approach.
The disparity in Crown and Mäori capacities in this area adds salience to this issue.
Greater Mäori social capability would minimise the need for greater prescription.  For
example, a capacity for “share-holder participation” by tribal members is an
important element in ensuring the function of iwi governance structures and the
accountability of leadership.
Another key governance issue is whether or not the current Mäori land-tenure
framework achieves a balance between protecting land from alienation and enabling
land to be managed as a commodity for sustainable economic development.
At a more specific level, good governance arrangements are important for enabling
distributive questions to be addressed, such as creating distributive mechanisms for
benefits from collectively owned assets.
Possible areas for further attention are:
• Facilitating the “enabling environment” for Mäori civil society.  Two streams of
public law work important to Mäori governance are the reform of the Mäori Trust
Boards Act 1955 and the review of the Mäori Community Development Act 1962.
Together these statutes address community, tribal, regional and national structures
and their review would provide the basis for a systematic consideration of
governance and community (including family) development in Mäori society. Work
on these should be revived.
• Building the constituency for good governance, through such things as facilitating
the availability of “best practice” models and better links with relevant agencies in
the Mäori governance area.  This might drive off the work of the Treaty of Waitangi
Fisheries Commission on iwi governance or the recent interest of the Law
Commission on asset management structures.
• Encouraging those Mäori institutions that receive public funding to investigate ways
to collaborate and build links with each other at the strategic and human (including
cultural) capital development levels.  This sharing should extend to the private
sector and internationally.
• Considering how to unlock the productive potential of multiply owned Mäori land
through on-going reform of the land tenure system.